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Abstract
The “agent program” framework introduced by Eiter, Subrahmanian and Pick [Artificial
Intelligence 108 (1–2) (1999) 179], supports developing agents on top of arbitrary legacy code.
Such agents are continuously engaged in an “event occurs → think → act → event occurs . . .” cycle.
However, this framework has two major limitations:
(1) all actions are assumed to have no duration, and
(2) all actions are taken now, but cannot be scheduled for the future.
In this paper, we present the concept of a “temporal agent program” (tap for short) and show that
using taps, it is possible to build agents on top of legacy code that can reason about the past and
about the future, and that can make temporal commitments for the future now. We develop a formal
semantics for such agents, extending the concept of a status set proposed by Eiter et al., and develop
algorithms to compute the status sets associated with temporal agent programs. Last, but not least,
we show how taps support the decision making of collaborative agents.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V.
All rights reserved.
Keywords: Agents; Heterogenous systems; Information integration; Temporal reasoning; Logic programming
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: dix@cs.man.ac.uk (J. Dix).
1 This work was carried out when the author was visiting the University of Maryland from January–October
1999.
2 The author gratefully acknowledges support from NSF grant # IIS9907482.
3 This work was supported by the Army Research Laboratory under contract number DAAL01-97-K0135,
by Army Research Office Grant DAAD190010484, by an NSF Young Investigator award IRI-93-57756, by a
TASC/DARPA grant J09301598061, and by DARPA/RL Contract F306029910552.
0004-3702/01/$ – see front matter  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0004-3702(01)0 00 52 -2
88 J. Dix et al. / Artificial Intelligence 127 (2001) 87–135
1. Introduction
The success of an agent development infrastructure in the real world hinges on many
aspects including, but not limited to:
(i) the ability of the infrastructure to build agents on top of legacy/specialized code-
bases without having to study the underlying source code,
(ii) the ability to declaratively specify the behavior of the agent,
(iii) the ability to guarantee that the agent will never cause certain “undesirable”
situations to arise,
(iv) the ability of agents to collaborate with each other,
(v) the ability of agents to reason about time and make commitments for the future,
(vi) the ability of agents to negotiate with each other and reason with (perhaps
uncertain) beliefs about other agents, etc.
In this paper, we focus on (v) in the context of a theory and implementation presented in [6,
30–32] that encapsulates (i)–(iii) comprehensively, and supports many aspects of (iv) [32]
and (vi) [28,29].
In this paper, we focus on the following features supporting (v) above.
(1) Agents must be able to execute actions that have duration. For instance, a vehicular
agent that is executing the action go(A,B) can hardly do this instantaneously when
A and B are two different locations.
(2) When agents execute actions with duration, the state of the agent might change
during the execution of the action, rather than at the end. This then raises the
question: should every tiny state change be recorded? Or should it be left to the agent
developer to decide when such changes during action execution be incorporated into
the state? We will support both options via a construct called a checkpoint defined
in this paper.
(3) We introduce the concept of a temporal agent program (tap for short) which allows
an agent developer to specify under what conditions and when an agent is permitted
to take actions, forbidden from taking certain actions, obliged to take actions,
etc. This is further complicated by the fact that actions may have effects over an
extended time period. taps extend the notion of an agent program [30] which we
have implemented in a system called IMPACT [31,68].
(4) In addition to the syntax of taps, we provide two semantics for taps which
extend semantics for ordinary agent programs. In [30], semantics of ordinary agent
programs were shown to extend semantics of logic programs as well as the semantics
of default and autoepistemic theories [53,60]. Thus we build on top of an extensively
studied and solid semantical foundation.
(5) The above semantics are defined in terms of a semantical construct called a temporal
status set for which we develop a compact representation.
(6) When an agent’s state changes (which may occur through receipt of a message
requesting a service or responding to a service request, or the tick of a clock, or
a random number generator, etc.), the agent must find a new temporal status set that
satisfies various semantical requirements. This tells the agent what it is obliged to
do now (and in the future), what it is permitted to do (now and in the future), what
it is forbidden from doing (now and in the future) and also allows it to determine
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what in fact it will do. We develop for positive taps algorithms to compute temporal
status sets in accordance with both the semantics we developed.
The contributions listed above leverage from contributions in several areas of AI and
computer science. We briefly overview areas of relevant research.
Temporal reasoning. There has been extensive work in temporal reasoning in computer
science. These fall into two broad categories—those that numerically represent time such
as virtually all work in databases [76, Chapters 5–7], multimedia systems [67], operating
systems and networks, and those that symbolically represent time (such as almost all work
in temporal logic and AI [37]). Explicit numeric time has also been used (perhaps to a
smaller extent) in AI [3].
The closest work in temporal agents to ours is the work on MetaTem [9] and its successor,
Concurrent MetaTem [34]. While many of the rules in MetaTem can be expressed via
taps and vice versa, not everything in MetaTem can be expressed via taps and vice versa.
A detailed comparison will be presented in Section 7. However, all the rules expressed in
Concurrent MetaTem as described in [9] are expressible via taps (see Section 7). Neither
MetaTem nor Concurrent MetaTem appears to be able to easily express the following
scenarios which are representative of a whole class of tap applications.
(1) We can express rules of the form “If the maximal time previously taken to ship a
package from location A to location B is T1, and if package P is required to be at
location B at time T , then ship package P sometime between time T − T1 − 10 and
T − T1”. This is a very reasonable statement to make in any logistics application,
but the time T might depend on the production schedule of the company at location
B (which may be determined at run-time from a database), and T2 likewise might
depend on the identities of locationsA,B (which may be instantiated at run time and
whose locations might therefore need to be inferred at run-time from a database).
In general, it appears hard to express in both MetaTem and Concurrent MetaTem,
temporal constraints on events where the occurrence time of those events needs to
be inferred dynamically from databases or by using a software packages. In fact,
the problem with classical temporal logic here is that it does not allow us to use
arguments of atoms/literals to instantiate the number of occurrences of a modal
connective like ©.
(2) Another example may say “If a prediction package expects a stock to rise K% after
TK units of time and K  25 then buy the stock at time (Xnow + TK − 2)”. This
cannot be easily expressed via MetaTem and Concurrent MetaTem even though this
has obvious value.
(3) The use of deontic modalities in our framework is not covered in MetaTem and
Concurrent MetaTem.
(4) Our mechanisms to access heterogeneous data structures and software packages is
an immediate contribution that can be used by MetaTem and Concurrent MetaTem.
(5) Last, but not least, study of integrity constraints in Concurrent MetaTem, and ways
of enforcing them appears to be an open issue.
(6) Conversely, Concurrent MetaTem has been extended in some interesting directions
such as support for beliefs that we do not handle. In addition, rule heads may
90 J. Dix et al. / Artificial Intelligence 127 (2001) 87–135
often contain a disjunction of literals which we also do not support in taps. These
extensions have obvious value.
We show how (1) and (2) above can be expressed via taps just before the beginning of
Section 4. We can also express Baudinet’s temporal logic programming framework [10]
as instances of taps as well as part but not all of Abadi and Manna’s TEMPLOG
framework [1] (see Section 7). (1) and (2) above are just as hard to express in these other
logics.
Active databases. There has also been extensive work on active databases [20] via the
notion of an event-condition-action (ECA) rule. ECA rules have the form “If condition C
is true in the current database state and actions A1, . . . ,An have been done and none of
actions B1, . . . ,Bm have been done, then do action A”. As we will show in Section 7,
ECA-rules are a special case of taps. ECA rules have been defined only for relational
databases [76, Chapters 2–4] and object bases [35]. In contrast, taps are defined on top of
arbitrary pieces of legacy code (not just relational and OO databases). Second, ECA-rules
have no temporal component. In contrast, taps allow temporal indeterminacy in ECA-
rules (e.g., “If the stock dropped U1 percent in the last day and U2 units the day before,
then sell the stock sometime in the next two hours”). Rules such as these support temporal
indeterminacy which ECA rules do not support. In addition, ECA-rules do not support
rules of the form “If person P was permitted to take action A and more than 5 time units
have elapsed since then and he has not taken actionA yet, then the system is obliged to take
action B some time in the next 10 time units”). For instance, action A might be “send in
tax return” and action B might be “send a reminder to person P about his/her tax return”.
Rules of this kind cannot be expressed via ECA-rules.
Logic programs and deductive databases. Logic programs and deductive databases have
extensively studied the problem of reasoning with rules of the form “If 〈 condition 〉 is
true, then formula F is true as well”. Variances in the syntax of condition C and F are
studied [48]. In fact, this work may be viewed as a continuation of this trend. However,
there are many differences: first and foremost, these systems assume either that all data is
represented as logical atoms or in a relational database. In contrast, taps can be built on top
of arbitrary bodies of software code. Second, these systems do not automatically allow us
to evaluate conditions such as “If state condition A and the obligation to do action B hold
simultaneously at some time point between time Xnow − 5 and Xnow and state condition C
holds at time Xnow and it is forbidden to perform action α now and state condition r(X)
holds, then perform action β at some time point in the next X time units”. In fact, we
feel it is important to point out that this paper cleanly extends well-studied semantics for
nonmonotonic logic programming such as the Herbrand model semantics and the minimal
model semantics.
Deontic logic. We borrow from the field of deontic logic, the syntax of deontic
statements; however we do not lay down the semantics of taps on the basis of one of the
numerous deontic logical systems (e.g., Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), which amounts to
the modal logic KD [5,52]). We mention that deontic logic has been plagued by paradoxical
behavior of the logic [5,52]. During the last 50 years, numerous systems of deontic
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logic based on modal logic have been proposed, but still most of these still suffer from
paradoxical behavior. Another reason for not building upon existing deontic logic systems
is that actions in deontic logic typically do not have effects—hence, the fact that a set
of actions may all be individually permitted, but mutually impossible to be concurrently
executed is not addressed in deontic logic. We address this. In addition, we explicitly
support nonmonotonic negation in tap rules, and provide a framework for agent decision
making on top of “real” legacy software packages. Last, but not least, we support temporal
indeterminacy in deontic obligations, permissions, and forbidden atoms, and we provide
algorithms to perform such computations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
(1) Section 2 first presents a brief motivating example that will be expanded on as the
paper proceeds. It then overviews the framework of [30] and explains how legacy
and specialized software code may be “agentized”.
(2) Section 3 shows how to specify actions with temporal duration and introduces the
syntax of a temporal agent program (tap).
(3) Section 4 develops two semantics for taps which extend the semantics introduced
for nontemporal agents in [30] based on the notion of a temporal status set (T Stnow ).
The section ends with a description of a compact representation of T Stnow ’s.
(4) Section 5 presents an algorithm that computes the (compact representation of a)
class of taps called positive taps.
(5) Finally, in Section 6, we present an application of taps. It is about individual agents
collaboratively working together to satisfy a shared goal.
(6) Section 7 compares and contrasts our work with existing research.
We refer the reader to [26], a technical report containing all the missing proofs of theorems
and lemmas in this paper.
2. Preliminaries
Before giving an overview of the IMPACT framework defined in [30,68], we start with
the following potential application.
Example 2.1 (Rescue-scenario). Consider a simplistic rescue operation where a natural
calamity (e.g., a flood) has stranded many people. Rescuing these people requires close
coordination between helicopters and ground vehicles. For the sake of this example, we
assume the existence of:
(1) a helicopter agent that conducts aerial reconnaissance and supports aerial rescues;
(2) a set gv1,gv2,gv3 of ground vehicles that move along the ground to appropriate
locations—such vehicles may include ambulances as well as earth moving vehicles;
(3) an immobile command center agent comc that coordinates between the helicopter
and the ground vehicles.
In our IMPACT system (which this paper extends), each agent a is built on top of a
body of software code (built in any programming language) that supports a well defined
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application programmer interface (either part of the code itself, or developed to augment
the code).
Definition 2.2 (Software code). We may characterize the code on top of which an agent a
is built as a triple Sa =def (T aS ,FaS ,CaS ) where:(1) T aS is the set of all data types managed by S ,(2) FaS is the set of predefined (API) functions over T aS through which external
processes may access a’s data, and
(3) CaS is a set of type composition operations. A type composition operator is a partial
n-ary function c which takes as input types τ1, . . . , τn and yields as output a type
c(τ1, . . . , τn).
This characterization of a piece of software code is widely used (cf. the Object Data
Management Group’s ODMG standard [15] and the CORBA framework [64]). Without
loss of generality, we will henceforth assume that TS is closed under the operations in CS .
Each agent also has a message box having a well defined set of associated code calls
that can be invoked by external programs.
Example 2.3 (Rescue example). Consider the rescue mission described earlier. The heli
agent may have the following data types and code calls.
• Data Types: speed,bearing of type int, location of type point (record containing
x, y, z fields), nextdest of type string, and inventory—a relation having schema
(Item,Qty,Unit).
• Functions:
– heli : location(): which specifies an (x, y, z) coordinate for the helicopter.
– heli : inventory(item): returns a pair of the form 〈Qty,Unit〉. For instance, heli :
inventory(blood) may return the pair 〈25, liters〉 specifying that the helicopter
currently has 25 units of blood available.
Definition 2.4 (State of an agent). The state of an agent at any given point t in time,
denoted OS (t), consists of the set of all data objects in the data structures (consisting of
types contained in T aS ) of the agent.
An agent’s state may change because it took an action, or because it received a message.
Throughout this paper we will assume that except for appending messages to an agent
a’s mailbox, another agent b cannot directly change a’s state. However, it might do so
indirectly by shipping the other agent a message requesting a change.
Example 2.5 (Rescue: state). For instance, at a given instant of time, the state of the heli
agent may consist of location = 〈45,50,9000〉, and inventory containing the following
four tuples: 〈fuel,125,gallons〉, 〈blood,25, litres〉, 〈bandages,50,−〉, 〈cotton,20, lbs〉.
Queries and/or conditions may be evaluated with respect to an agent state using the
notion of a code call atom and a code call condition defined below.
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Definition 2.6 (Code call/Code call atom). If S is the name of a software package, f is a
function defined in this package, and (d1, . . . , dn) is a tuple of arguments of the input type
of f , then S : f (d1, . . . ,dn) is called a code call.
If cc is a code call, and X is either a variable symbol, or an object of the output type of
cc, then in(X, cc) is called a code call atom.
If X is a variable over type τ and τ is a record structure with field f , then X.f is a
variable ranging over objects of the type of field f .
Definition 2.7 (Code call condition).
(1) Every code call atom is a code call condition.
(2) If s,t are either variables or objects, then s= t is a code call condition.
(3) If s,t are either integers/real valued objects, or are variables over the integers/reals,
then s< t,s> t,s t,s t are code call conditions.
(4) If χ1, χ2 are code call conditions, then χ1 &χ2 is a code call condition.
A code call condition satisfying any of the first three criteria above is an atomic code call
condition.
For example, in(X, heli : inventory(fuel))&X.Qty< 50 is a code call condition that
is satisfied whenever the helicopter has less than 50 gallons of fuel left.
Each agent has an associated action-base describing various actions that the agent is
capable of executing. An action (whose behavior is that of a partial function from states
to states) is implemented by a body of code in any suitable imperative (or declarative)
programming language. The agent reasons about actions via a set of preconditions and
effects defining the conditions an agent state must satisfy for the action to be considered
executable, and the new state that results from such an execution. We assume that the
preconditions and effects associated with an action correctly specify the behavior of the
code implementing the action. Note, that in addition to changing the state of the agent,
an action may change the state of other agents’ msgboxes. In this paper, the actions
preconditions will be expressed via code call conditions and the effects will be expressed
by add/delete lists which are sets of ground code call atoms.
Each agent has
(i) a set of integrity constraints—only states that satisfy these constraints are
considered to be valid or legal states,
(ii) a notion of concurrency specifying how to combine a set of actions into a single
action,
(iii) a set of action constraints that define the circumstances under which certain actions
may be concurrently executed, and
(iv) an Agent Program that determines what actions the agent can take, what actions the
agent cannot take, and what actions the agent must take.
Agent programs are defined in terms of status atoms defined below.
Definition 2.8 (Status atom/Status set). If α(t) is an action, and Op ∈ {P,F,W,Do,O},
then Opα(t ) is called a status atom. If A is a status atom, then A,¬A are called status
literals. A status set is a finite set of ground status atoms.
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Table 1
Glossary 1: basic notation
Notation Description Definition
Sa Software code on top of which a is built Definition 2.2
T aS Data types of software code Sa Definition 2.2
FaS Function of software code Sa Definition 2.2
CaS Type composition operations Definition 2.2
OS (t) State of an agent at time t Definition 2.4
in(X, cc) Code call atom indicating that (X ∈ cc) Definition 2.6
χ Code call condition Definition 2.7
Opα(t) Status atom, e.g., Pα,Oα,Doα,Wα Definition 2.8
Li Status literal, e.g., Pα and ¬Pα Definition 2.8
IC Integrity constraints Section 2
AC Action constraints Section 2
Intuitively, Pα means α is permitted, Fα means α is forbidden, Oα means α is
obligatory, Doα means α is actually done, and Wα means that the obligation to perform
α is waived.
Definition 2.9 (Agent program). An agent program P is a finite set of rules of the form
A← χ &L1 & · · ·&Ln, where χ is a code call condition, Li are status literals and A is a
status atom.
Several alternative semantics for agent programs are presented in [30,32].
2.1. Notational conventions
As this paper involves heterogeneous data sources, deontic modalities, actions, logical
methods, and temporal reasoning, all of which are complex subjects of research in their
own right, it is inevitable that the paper is heavy on notation. We end this section with
two tables listing the terminology used. While Table 1 contains the basic notation already
introduced in [30,32], Table 2 points to the new notions introduced in this paper.
In addition, we note that agents always appear in the agent font while functions
and constants in software packages are written in italics. Variables and types come in
typewriter font: in(X, agent : function(const1,Var2)). Actions α are denoted by lower
Greek letters. Calligraphic letters are used for meta objects, which are whole collections of
objects: T aS , OS (t), IC, T P . Boldface is also used for meta-theoretic notions: operators
like DT P , closures like D-Cl(),A-Cl(), and the deontic modalities P, Do, O, P, W.
The newly introduced temporal annotations and all things that have to do with time are
put into a sans serif font to distinguish them from our base terminology: tnow, rel:{X | χ},
duration(α), checkpoints(α), tai, tasc, histtnow , tic, TSS.
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Table 2
Glossary 2: notions with respect to temporal approach
Notation Description Definition
rel:{X | χ} Relative checkpoint expression, Definition 3.1
rel:{i} e.g., rel:{20}, rel:{X|in(X,math : compute( To−FromSpeed ))}
abs:{X | χ} Absolute checkpoint expression, e.g., abs:{20} Definition 3.1
abs:{i} abs:{T | in(T, clock : time())}
tai Temporal annotation item, e.g., 5,Xnow + 3 Definition 3.7
[tai1, tai2] Temporal annotation, e.g., [1,7] Definition 3.8
B(! :ta) Action status literals in ! Definition 3.9
B−(! :ta) Negative literals in B(! :ta) Definition 3.9
¬.B−(! :ta) Atoms that occur negatively in B−(! :ta) Definition 3.9
T P Temporal agent program Definition 3.10
T Stnow Temporal status set Definition 4.1
histtnow State history function Definition 4.2
acthisttnow Action history Definition 4.5
EO(t) Expected states at time t Definition 4.8
tic Temporal interval constraint: (5 t  10) Definition 4.19
Opα :tic Interval constraint annotated status atom Definition 4.20
ic-T S Interval constraint temporal status set Definition 4.21
CompTSS Temporal status sets compatible with ic-T S Definition 4.22
DT P An operator that applies T P on its input ic-T S once Definition 5.1
H Constraint hitting set Definition 5.8
chs(ic-T S) The set of all constraint hitting sets for ic-T S Definition 5.8
3. Syntax of taps
In this section, we introduce the syntax of temporal agent programs (taps for short), and
provide an “intuitive” semantics for them—the formal semantics is deferred to Section 4.
An important feature of a tap is that it makes statements about the status of actions.
Consequently, Section 3.1, starts by extending the notion of action to timed actions.
3.1. Actions with temporal duration
Most real-world actions have a duration. Moreover, while the action takes place, it
might be important to specify intermediate time points, checkpoints (Definition 3.1), and
to update the current state incrementally at these prespecified points. This updating of a
state is specified in our framework by timed effect triples (Definition 3.3). Both notions are
important ingredients for our definition of a timed action (Definition 3.5).
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For example, the heli agent in our Rescue Example may execute the action
fly("BigRag","StonyPoint"). This action has a temporal duration during which the lo-
cation of heli is changing continuously. More importantly, if we know the location of the
plane now and we know the plane’s velocity and climb angle, we can precisely compute its
location in the future (assuming no change in these parameters). Thus, in order to specify
a timed action, we must:
(1) Specify an estimate of the total amount of time it takes for the action to be
“completed”.
(2) Specify exactly how the state of the agent changes while the action is being executed.
It is worth noting that the duration of an action can be precisely specified in some cases, but
not in others. For instance, saying that the action drive(i95, south,60) should be executed
for 2 hours is a precise specification saying that the action “Drive south on Interstate I-95
at 60 mph” for 2 hours is a precise specification of action duration. However, it is hard to
specify durations of actions such as drive(washington,baltimore). In this case, the above
definition requires an estimate to be provided. 4
A further complication may arise when we consider the gv1,gv2,gv3 ground vehicle
agents executing the action
drive(front_royal, thornton, rte354)
saying that the vehicle in question is driving from Front Royal to Thornton along Route
354. Here, there may be no easy “formula” that allows us to specify where the vehicle is at
a given instant of time, and furthermore, there may be no need to know that the vehicle has
moved one mile further west along Interstate I-90 since the last report. The designer of the
gv1 agent may be satisfied with knowing the location of the vehicle every 30 minutes.
3.1.1. Checkpoints
Thus, the notion of a timed action should allow the designer of an agent to specify
the preconditions of an action, as well as intermediate effects that the action has prior to
completion. That is, a given action α takes some time to execute. While α is executing,
the state of the agent is changing. Checkpoints are used to model these intermediate
changes. In particular, Checkpoints are time points when the agent’s state is updated during
execution of the action. For example, an action that takes 75 units of time starting at
time 0 may have checkpoints every 15 units of time, i.e., at times 15, 30, 45, 60, and
75. This means that every 15 time units, the state is updated. Note, that the execution
of the action is not interrupted by the checkpoints. For example, consider the action
drive(front_royal, thornton, rte354) which affects the location of the vehicle. Thus, in each
checkpoint the state of the vehicle agent is changed, however, the agent does not stop its
driving for doing so. Checkpoints bear a resemblance to “interrupts” in operating systems
and microprocessors, as they require certain actions (i.e., state updates) to be taken when
certain events (in this case, a clock tick indicating reaching a checkpoint) occur.
4 One could extend this to have uncertainty in duration. For instance, one might specify that it takes between
30 minutes and 120 minutes to drive from Washington to Baltimore and that a probability distribution δ gives us
the probability, δ(t), that it will take exactly t minutes to do the trip. However, this would greatly complicate the
framework proposed here and hence we defer this to future work.
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It is important to note that it is the agent designer’s responsibility to specify checkpoints
in a manner that satisfies his application’s needs. For instance, if he needs to incorporate
intermediate effects on a millisecond by millisecond basis, his checkpoints should be
spaced out at each millisecond. The checkpoints can be specified using absolute times
(indicated with abs) or relative to the beginning of the execution of the action (indicated
with rel). We are now ready to define checkpoint expressions.
Definition 3.1 (Checkpoint expressions rel:{X | χ},abs:{X | χ}).
• If i ∈N is a positive integer, then rel:{i} and abs:{i} are checkpoint expressions.
• If χ is a code call condition involving a non-negative, integer-valued variable X, then
rel:{X | χ} and abs:{X | χ} are checkpoint expressions.
rel : {i} says that a checkpoint occurs every i units of time from the start of an action.
abs : {i} says that a checkpoint occurs at time i . rel : {X | χ} says that for every possible
value i of X that makes χ true in the current state, a checkpoint occurs every i units of
time from the start of an action. Similarly, abs : {X | χ} says that a checkpoint occurs at
every instance of X that makes X | χ true. We use cpe as a metavariable for relative and
absolute checkpoint expressions. The following example presents some simple checkpoint
expressions.
Example 3.2 (Rescue: checkpoints).
• rel:{100}. This says that a checkpoint occurs at the time of the start of the action, 100
units later, 200 units later, and so on.
• abs : {T | in(T, clock : time())& in(0, math : remainder(T,100))&T > 5000}.
This says that a checkpoint occurs at absolute times 5000, 5100, 5200, and so on.
• abs:{T | in(T, clock : time())& in(X, getMessage(comc))&X.Time−T= 5}. This
says that a checkpoint occurs at 5 time units after a message is received from the comc
agent.
3.1.2. Timed actions
While checkpoint expressions provide a convenient way of specifying a set of time
points, timed effect triples (defined below) specify how to change a state when a checkpoint
is encountered.
Definition 3.3 (Timed effect triple 〈cpe,Add,Del〉). A timed effect triple is a triple of the
form 〈cpe,Add,Del〉 where cpe is a checkpoint expression, and Add and Del are add lists
and delete lists.
Intuitively, if 〈cpe,Add,Del〉 is associated with α, then the contents of the Add and Del
lists are used to update the state of the agent at every time point specified by cpe. A couple
of simple timed effect triples are shown below.
Example 3.4 (Rescue: timed effect triples).
• The truck agent may use the following timed effect triple to update its fuel at absolute
times 5000, 5100, 5200, and so on.
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1st arg :
abs:{T | in(T,clock : time())&
in(0,math : remainder(T,100))&T> 5000}.
2nd arg : {in(NewFuelLevel, truck : fuelLevel(Xnow))}.
3rd arg : {in(OldFuelLevel, truck : fuelLevel(Xnow − 20))}.
We are now ready to define the concept of a timed action.
Definition 3.5 (Timed action). A timed action α consists of:
Name: A name, usually written α(X1, . . . ,Xn), where the Xi ’s are root variables.
Schema: A schema, usually written as (τ1, . . . , τn), of types. Intuitively, this says that the
variable Xi must be of type τi , for all 1 i  n.
Pre: A code-call condition χ , called the precondition of the action, denoted by
Pre(α). 5
Dur: An expression of the form {i} or {X | χ}. Depending on the current object state,
this expression determines a duration duration(α) ∈ N of α. duration(α) is not
used as an absolute time point but as a duration (length of a time interval).
Tet: A set Tet(α) of timed effect triples such that if both 〈cpe,Add,Del〉 and
〈cpe′,Add′,Del′〉 are in Tet(α), then cpe and cpe′ have no common solution with
respect to any object state. The set Tet(α) together with Dur(α) determines the
set of checkpoints checkpoints(α) for action α (as defined below).
Intuitively, if α is an action that we start executing at tαstart, then Dur(α) specifies
how to compute the duration duration(α) of α, and Tet(α) specifies the checkpoints
associated with action α. It is important to note that Dur(α) and Tet(α) may not specify
the duration and checkpoint times explicitly (even if the associated checkpoints are of the
form abs:{X | χ}, i.e., absolute times). The method to compute duration(α) is given below.
• If Dur(α) is of the form {i}, then duration(α)= i .
• If Dur(α) is of the form {X | χ}, then
– If there is a solution is a solution of χ with respect to OS at time tαstart then:
duration(α)= min{‖Xθ − tαstart‖ | θ is a solution of χ with respect to OS
at time tαstart and Xθ  tαstart
}
.
– Otherwise, duration(α) is not defined with respect to OS at time tαstart.
Intuitively, the above definition says that we find solutions to χ which are greater than
or equal to tαstart. Of such solutions, we pick the smallest—the duration of α is from
5 As in [31], we require that Pre(α) be safe modulo the variables X1, . . . ,Xn , i.e., assuming the variables
X1, . . . ,Xn are grounded, there must be some way in which the atoms in χ can be reordered so that the (reordered)
version of χ can be evaluated from left to right. The formal definition of this is contained in [31] and is not
required for this paper.
J. Dix et al. / Artificial Intelligence 127 (2001) 87–135 99
α’s start time, to the time point chosen in this way. If such a solution is not found,
performing α is infeasible.
The set, checkpoints(α), of checkpoints is the union of the following five sets:
• {tαstart + duration(α)}.
• {Xθ | 〈abs:{X | χ},Add,Del〉 ∈ Tet(α) and θ is a solution of χ , Xθ  tαstart
and ‖Xθ − tαstart‖ duration(α)}.• {i | 〈abs:{i},Add,Del〉 ∈ Tet(α), i  tαstart and ‖i − tαstart‖ duration(α)}.
• {tαstart+ i×j | 〈rel:{i},Add,Del〉 ∈ Tet(α) and i, j ∈N, i, j > 0
with i × j  duration(α)}.
• {tαstart + i ×Xθ | 〈rel : {X | χ},Add,Del〉 ∈ Tet(α) and θ is a solution of χ and
i ∈N, i > 0 and ‖tαstart + i × Xθ‖ duration(α)}.
In other words, even though Tet(α) may imply the existence of infinitely many
checkpoints, only those that occur at or before the scheduled completion of the action
α are considered to be valid checkpoints. In addition, the last time period of executing an
action is always a checkpoint.
Example 3.6 (Rescue: timed actions). Returning to the Rescue example, we have the
following timed action drive() of the truck agent which may be described via the
following components:
• Name: drive(From,To,Highway).
• Schema: (String, String, String).
• Pre: in(From, truck : location()).
• Dur: {T | in(X,math : distance(From,To))& in(T,math : compute(60X70 ))}.• Tet:
1st arg : rel:{20}
2nd arg : {in(NewPosition, truck : location(Xnow))}
3rd arg : {in(OldPosition, truck : location(Xnow − 20))}.
The Tet part says that the truck agent updates its location every 20 minutes (assuming a
time period is equal to 1 minute) during the expected time it takes it to drive the distance
between From to To at 70 km per hour.
3.2. Temporal action state conjuncts
An agent may often base its actions (current and future) not only on its current/past state,
but also on its current/past actions. Thus, we need to be able to specify temporal conditions
involving an agent’s state and actions. This is done via the concept of a temporal action
state conjunct defined below.
Definition 3.7 (Temporal annotation item tai).
(1) Every integer is a temporal annotation item.
(2) The distinguished integer valued variable Xnow is a temporal annotation item.
(3) Every integer valued variable is a temporal annotation item.
(4) If tai1, . . . , tain are temporal annotation items, and b1, . . . , bn are integers (positive
or negative), then (b1tai1 + · · · + bntain) is a temporal annotation item.
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For example, 1, Xnow, Xnow + 3, Xnow + 2v+ 4 are all temporal annotation items if v is an
integer valued variable. Temporal annotation items, when ground, evaluate to time points.
They are used to specify a time interval.
Definition 3.8 (Temporal annotation [tai1, tai2]). If tai1, tai2 are annotation items, then
[tai1, tai2] is a temporal annotation.
For example, [2,5] is a temporal annotation item describing the set of time points
between 2 and 5 (inclusive). [2,3X+4Y] is a temporal annotation item. When X := 2,Y :=
3, this defines the set of time points between 2 and 18. [Xnow,Xnow + 5] is a temporal
annotation item. When Xnow := 10, this specifies the set of time points between 10 and 15.
Definition 3.9 ((Temporal) action state condition). Suppose χ is a (possibly empty) code
call condition, L1, . . . ,Ln are action status literals, and ta is a temporal annotation. Then:
(1) (χ &L1 & · · ·&Ln) is called an action state condition.
(2) (χ &L1 & · · ·&Ln) : ta is called a temporal action state condition (tasc).
(3) If χ is empty, then (χ &L1 & · · ·&Ln) : ta is called a state-independent tasc.
Otherwise, it is called state-dependent tasc.
For any tasc ! : ta, we denote by B(! : ta), the collection of action status literals in !;
by B−(! : ta) we denote the negative literals in B(! : ta), and by B+(! : ta) the positive
literals in B(! :ta). Moreover,¬.B−(! :ta) denotes the status atoms whose negations occur
in B−(! :ta).
Intuitively, when ! : ta is ground for some action state condition !, we may read this as
“! is true at some point in ta”. The following is a simple tasc.
• (in(X, heli : inventory(fuel))&X.Qty< 50) : [Xnow−10,Xnow]. Intuitively, this tasc
is true if at some point in time ti in the last 10 time units, the helicopter had less than
50 gallons of fuel left.
We are now ready to define the most important syntactic construct of this paper, a temporal
agent rule.
Definition 3.10 (Temporal agent rule/Program T P). A temporal agent rule is an
expression of the form Opα : [tai1, tai2] ← !1 : ta1 & · · ·&!n : tan, where Op ∈ {P,Do,
F,O,W}, and !1 : ta1, . . . , !n : tan are tascs. A temporal agent program is a finite set of
temporal agent rules.
Intuitive reading of temporal agent rule: “If for all 1 i  n, there exists a time point ti
such that !i is true at time ti such that either
(1) !i is state independent and ti ∈ tai , or
(2) !i is state dependent and ti  tnow (i.e., ti is now or is in the past) and ti ∈ tai ,
then Opα is true at some point t  tnow (i.e., now or in the future) such that tai1  t  tai2”.
This reading of a tap rule allows us to avoid several problems. The requirement that
t  tnow is to prevent cases in which something that becomes true now will lead to
obligations in the past. In other words, the antecedent of a rule always refers to past or
current states of the world, and past action status atoms, and the obligations, permissions,
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forbidden actions that are implied by rules apply to the future. Note that this framework is
completely compatible with basing actions on predictions about the future, because such
predictions are made now and hence are statements about the future in the current state!
The agent knows its current state and its states in the past. It is very difficult to predict
its future states, which may depend on future actions of itself and others. Thus, we require
that if !i is state dependent it will be true either now or in the past to make the rule fireable.
On the other hand, agents are familiar with its future obligations, permissions etc., so it can
evaluate state independent atoms in the future. Thus, we allow ti > tnow for ti ∈ tai .
We close this section by showing how taps can be used to express the two rules
introduced in the introduction of this paper. We use two relational databases—one called
shipdata containing at least the attributes shiptime,orig,dest (and perhaps
other ones as well) which specifies data (such as shipping time) associated with past
shipments. The other relational table is called sched which has at least the attributes
reqtime,place,item specifying which items are required at what time by what
places.
Do ship(P,A,B) : [T− T1 − 10,T− T1] ←
(in(T1,db : sql(‘SELECT MAX shiptime FROM shipdata WHERE
orig= A&dest= B ′)))&
in(T,db : sql(‘SELECT reqtime FROM place WHERE
item= P ′)) : [Xnow,Xnow].
The second example in the introduction may be modeled as follows. We assume a
prediction package that given a stock uses (some stock expertise) to predict the change
in the value of the stock at future time points. This function returns a set of pairs of the
form (T ,C). Intuitively, this says that T units from now, the stock price will change by C
percent (positive or negative).
Do buy(S) : [Xnow + X.T− 2,Xnow + X.T− 2] ←
(in(X, pred : dest(S))&X.C 25) : [Xnow,Xnow].
4. Semantics of taps
In this section, we provide a formal semantics for taps, building upon the informal
intuitions provided in the preceding section.
First and foremost, we reiterate that in our framework, we use the natural numbers to
represent time. In classical temporal logics, a temporal interpretation associates a set of
ground atoms with each time point. In our framework, things are somewhat more complex.
This is because at any given point t in time, certain things are true in an agent’s state, and
certain action status atoms are true as well. Thus, we introduce two temporal structures:
(1) a temporal status set, which captures actions, and
(2) a history.
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4.1. Temporal status set
A temporal status set extends the notion of a status set in much the same way as a
temporal interpretation extends the classical logical notion of an interpretation [48].
Definition 4.1 (Temporal status set T Stnow ). A temporal status set T Stnow at time tnow
is a mapping from natural numbers to ordinary status sets satisfying T Stnow(i)= ∅ for all
i > i0 for some i0 ∈N.
Intuitively, if T Stnow(3) = {Oα,Doα,Pα,Fβ}, then this means that according to the
temporal status set T Stnow , at time instant 3, α is obligatory/done/permitted, while β is
forbidden. Similarly, if T Stnow (4)= {Pα} then according to the temporal status set T Stnow ,
at time 4, α is permitted.
As an agent that reasons about time may need to reason about the current, as well as past
states it was/is in, a notion of state history is needed.
Definition 4.2 (State history function histtnow ). A state history function histtnow at time
tnow is a partial function from N to agent states such that histtnow(tnow) is always defined
and for all i > tnow, histtnow(i) is undefined.
The definition of state history does not require that an agent store the entire past. For
many agent applications, storing the entire past may be neither necessary nor desirable.
The definition of state history function above merely requires that the agent stores the
current agent state—which past agent states are to be stored is the choice of the agent
designer. Furthermore, an agent cannot store future states, though it can schedule actions
for the future (in its current state) and it may have beliefs (in its current state) about the
future. Thus, the designer of an agent may make decisions such as those given below:
(1) He may decide to store no past information at all. In this case, histtnow(i) is defined
if and only if i = tnow.
(2) He may decide to store information only about the past i units of time. This means
that he stores the agent’s state at times tnow, (tnow−1), . . . , (tnow− i), i.e., histtnow
is defined for the following arguments: histtnow(tnow), histtnow(tnow − 1), . . . ,
histtnow(tnow − i) are defined.
(3) He may decide to store, in addition to the current state, the history every five time
units. That is, histtnow(tnow) is defined and for each 0  i  tnow, if i mod 5 = 0,
then histtnow(i) is defined. Such an agent may be specified by an agent designer
when he believes that maintaining some (but not all) past snapshots is adequate for
his application’s needs.
Suppose we are given a temporal status set T Stnow and a state history function, histtnow .
We define below, what it means for a triple consisting of T Stnow ,histtnow and the current
time, tnow, to satisfy a tap.
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Definition 4.3 (Satisfaction, closure of T Stnow under tap rules). Suppose tnow is any
integer. We present below, an inductive definition of satisfaction of formulas by 〈T Stnow ,
histtnow ,tnow〉;
(1) (a) State independent tasc:
〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp (L1 & · · ·&Ln) : [tai1, tai2] where L1 & · · ·&
Ln : [tai1, tai2] is ground if there is an integer i , tai1  i  tai2 such that
B+((L1 & · · ·&Ln) : [tai1, tai2]) ⊆ T Stnow(i) and for every L ∈ ¬.B−((L1 &
· · ·&Ln) : [tai1, tai2]) L /∈ T Stnow(i). In this case, i is said to witness the truth
of this tasc.
(b) General tasc:
〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp (χ &L1 & · · ·&Ln) : [tai1, tai2] where the con-
junction χ &L1 & · · ·&Ln : [tai1, tai2] is ground if there is an integer i ,
tai1  i  tai2 such that histtnow(i) is defined and χ is true in the agent
state histtnow(i) and B+((L1 & · · ·&Ln) : [tai1, tai2])⊆ T Stnow(i) and for every
L ∈¬.B−((L1 & · · ·&Ln) : [tai1, tai2]), L /∈ T Stnow(i). In this case, i is said to
witness the truth of this tasc.
(2) 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp Opα : [tai1, tai2] ← !1 : ta1 & · · ·&!n : tan (where
the rule is ground) if either:
(a) there exists an 1 i  n such that either (1) !i is state independent and for all
ti ∈ tai , ti is not a witness to the truth of !i : tai by 〈T Stnow ,histtnow,tnow〉, or
(2) !i is state dependent and for all ti  tnow and ti ∈ tai , ti is not a witness to
the truth of !i : tai by 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉, or
(b) there exists a tj  tnow such that tj ∈ [tai1, tai2] and Opα ∈ T Stnow(tj ).
If a temporal agent rule r is not ground, 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp r if for all
ground instances of the rule r ′, 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp r ′.
(3) 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp (∀x)φ if 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp φ[x/s] for
all ground terms s. 6
(4) 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp (∃x)φ if 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp φ[x/s] for
some ground term s.
(5) 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp T P where T P is a tap if for each temporal agent
rule (tar) r ∈ T P : 〈T Stnow ,histtnow,tnow〉 |=Otemp r .
Instead of 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 |=Otemp T P we also say “T Stnow is closed under the
program rules of T P”.
The definition of satisfaction by 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 is complex. In particular,
item (2) in the above definition has subtle aspects to it. We illustrate some of these subtleties
by revisiting the rescue example.
Example 4.4 (Rescue: temporal status set). Consider the following very simple table,
describing a temporal status set, T Stnow of the truck agent (Table 3).
Suppose we also consider the very simple table describing the state of the truck agent
(Table 4).
6 Here φ[x/s] denotes the replacement of all free occurrences of x in φ by ground term s .
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Table 3
i T Stnow (i)
0 {F drive(was,bal,hw95),F drive(was,bal,hw295),
O fill_fuel(),Do fill_fuel()}
1 {P drive(was,bal,hw95),F drive(was,bal,hw295),F fill_fuel()}
2 {P drive(was,bal,hw95),F drive(was,bal,hw295)}
3 {O drive(was,bal,hw95),Do drive(was,bal,hw95),
F drive(was,bal,hw295),P drive(was,bal,hw95),
O order_item(fa_bag),Do order_item(fa_bag)}
4 {P drive(was,bal,hw95),Do drive(was,bal,hw95),
F drive(was,bal,hw295),Do fill_fuel()}
4 < i < 9 {P drive(was,bal,hw295),F drive(was,bal,hw295)}
i > 9 ∅
Table 4
i histtnow (i)
0 in(hw295, msgbox : gatherWarning(comc)), in(true, truck : tank_empty())
1 in(false, truck : tank_empty())
2 in(false, truck : tank_empty()), in(2, truck : inventory(fa_bag))
3 in(1, truck : inventory(fa_bag)), in(false, truck : tank_empty())
Suppose tnow = 3. Let us examine some simple ground formulas and see whether
〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 satisfies these formulas.
• ( in(2, truck : inventory(fa_bag)) &
in(false, truck : tank_empty())
) : [tnow − 3,tnow].
This formula is satisfied by 〈T Stnow ,histtnow,tnow〉 because i = 2 is a witness to the
satisfaction of this formula.
• The rule
F drive(was,bal,hw295) : [tnow,tnow + 3]←
in(hw295, msgbox : gatherWarning(comc)) : [tnow − 3,tnow]
is satisfied by 〈T Stnow ,histtnow,tnow〉 because its antecedent is satisfied by it (witness
i = 0 < tnow) and its consequent is true at a future time instant, viz. at time 3 tnow.
• Consider the following tap
(1) F drive(was,bal,hw295) : [tnow,tnow + 2] ←
in(hw295,msgbox : gatherWarning(comc)) : [tnow − 3,tnow].
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(2) Do fill_fuel() : [tnow,tnow] ←
in(true, truck : tank_empty()) : [tnow − 2,tnow].
(3) O order_item(fa_bag) : [tnow,tnow + 4] ←
in(1, truck : inventory(fa_bag))[tnow − 3,tnow].
(4) P drive(was,bal,hw95) : [tnow,tnow] ←
in(false, truck : tank_empty()) : [tnow,tnow] &
F drive(was,bal,hw295) : [tnow + 1,tnow + 2].
This tap is satisfied by 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 as all its temporal agent rules
are satisfied. The first rule is satisfied by 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉, because its
antecedent is satisfied by a witness i = 3  tnow, and its consequent is satisfied as
F drive(was,bal,hw295) ∈ T Stnow (i  3).
The second rule is satisfied by 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉, because its antecedent is not
satisfied—in(true, truck : tank_empty()) /∈ histtnow (2 i  tnow).
The third rule is satisfied by 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉, because its antecedent is satis-
fied via witness i = 3  tnow and its consequent is satisfied because
O order_item(fa_bag) ∈ T Stnow(3).
Finally, the fourth rule is satisfied by 〈T Stnow ,histtnow ,tnow〉 since its antecedent is
satisfied and its consequent is satisfied. The first tasc of the antecedent, in(false,
truck : tank_empty()) : [Xnow,Xnow], is satisfied via a witness i = 3  tnow. The
second tasc, F drive(was,bal,hw295) : [tnow+ 1,tnow+ 2], is state independent and
is satisfied as F drive(was,bal,hw295) ∈ T Stnow(4) The rule’s consequent is satisfied
as P drive(was,bal,hw95) ∈ T Stnow(3).
An agent may record not only its state history, but also the actions it took (or was obliged
to take, forbidden from taking etc.) in the past. This leads to the notion of an action history.
Definition 4.5 (Action history). An action history acthisttnow for an agent is a partial
function from N to status sets satisfying acthisttnow(i)= ∅ for all i > i0 for a i0 ∈N.
Intuitively, an action history specifies not only what the agent has done in the past, but
also what an agent is obliged/permitted to or forbidden from doing in the future. In this
respect, an action history is different from a state history.
An action history and a temporal status set both make statements about action status
atoms. The following definition specifies what it means for the two to be compatible.
Definition 4.6 (History-compatible temporal status set). Suppose the current time is
tnow and acthisttnow(·) denotes the action history of an agent, and suppose T Stnow is a
temporal status set. T Stnow is said to be action history-compatible at time tnow if for all
i < tnow, if acthisttnow(i) is defined, then T Stnow(i)= acthisttnow(i), and for all i  tnow,
if acthisttnow(i) is defined, then acthisttnow(i)⊆ T Stnow(i).
In other words, for a temporal status set to be compatible with an action history, it must
be consistent with the past history of actions taken by the agent and with commitments to
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Table 5
i acthist3(i)
0 {F drive(was,bal,hw95),F drive(was,bal,hw295),O fill_fuel(),
Do fill_fuel()}
1 {P drive(was,bal,hw95),F drive(was,bal,hw295),F fill_fuel()}
3 {O drive(was,bal,hw95),Do drive(was,bal,hw295),
F drive(was,bal,hw295)}
4 i < 9 {F drive(was,bal,hw295)}
do things in the future that were made in the past by the agent. An example illustrating this
kind of compatibility is given below.
Example 4.7 (Rescue: action history). The temporal status set, T Stnow presented in
Example 4.4 is history-compatible with the above action history at time tnow = 3 (Table 5).
Given the agent’s current temporal status set and its plans about the future, it has some
expectation about how its future states will change over time. This leads to the notion of
expected states.
Definition 4.8 (Expected states at time t: EO(t)). Suppose the current time is tnow, histtnow
is the agent’s state history function and T Stnow is a temporal status set. The agent’s
expected states are defined as follows:
• EO(tnow)= histtnow(tnow).
• For all time points i > tnow, EO(i) is the result of concurrently executing
{α | Doα ∈ T Snow(i − 1)}∪
{β ′ | Doβ ∈ T Snow(j) for j  i − 1 and i − 1 is a checkpoint for β, and β ′
denotes the action (non-timed) which has an empty precondition,
and whose add and del lists are as specified by Tet(β)}
in state EO(i − 1).
We note that that from a certain i0 ∈N onwards, we have EO(i)= ∅ for all i > i0 (this is
because of the same property for the action history and the temporal status set).
Example 4.9 (Rescue: expected states). Suppose, tnow = 1,
histtnow(0) = {in(was, truck : location()), in(true, truck : tank_empty()),
in(empty, truck : load(0))},
histtnow(1) = {in(was, truck : location()), in(true, truck : tank_empty()),
in(empty, truck : load(0))},
J. Dix et al. / Artificial Intelligence 127 (2001) 87–135 107
T Stnow(0) = {Do load_truck(was)},
T Stnow(1) = {Do fill_fuel()},
T Stnow(10) = {Do order_item(fa_bag)},
EO(2) = {in(empty, truck : load(0)), in(was, truck : location()),
in(false, truck : tank_empty())},
For, 3 i  5, EO(i)= EO(2).
EO(6) = {in(half _loaded, truck : load(5)), in(was, truck : location()),
in(false, truck : tank_empty())}.
For, 7 i  10, EO(i)= EO(6).
EO(11) = { in(loaded, truck : load(10)), in(was, truck : location()),
in(false, truck : tank_empty()),
in(〈fa_bag,10〉, msgbox : supplier_to_be_notified())}.
For, i > 11, EO(i)= EO(11).
It is apparent that given a temporal agent program, and a state/action history associated
with that tap, temporal status sets must satisfy some “feasibility” requirements in order for
them to be considered to represent the semantics of the tap in question. We are now ready
to address the issue of what constitutes a feasible temporal status set.
4.2. Feasible temporal status sets
Let us consider an agent a that uses a temporal agent program tap to determine what
actions it should take, and when it should take these actions. Let the current time be tnow
and suppose histtnow(·),acthisttnow(·) represent the state and action histories associated
with this agent at time tnow.
Given a set S of action status atoms, let D-Cl(S) be the smallest superset S′ of S such
that Oα ∈ S′ → Pα ∈ S′. Likewise, let A-Cl(S) be the smallest superset S∗ of S such that
(i) Oα ∈ S∗ → Doα ∈ S∗ and
(ii) Doα ∈ S∗ → Pα ∈ S∗.
We say that set S is deontically closed iff S = D-Cl(S) and action closed iff S = A-Cl(S).
Definition 4.10 (Temporal deontic consistency). Suppose histtnow is the agent’s state
history function. T Stnow is said to be temporally deontically consistent at time tnow if
it satisfies the following conditions:
• For all time points i , (1) Oα ∈ T Stnow(i)→ Wα /∈ T Stnow(i); (2) Pα ∈ T Stnow(i)→
Fα /∈ T Stnow(i);
• For all i  tnow, if Pα ∈ T Stnow(i) and histtnow(i) is defined, then histtnow(i) |=
Pre(α) and duration(α) is defined with respect to histtnow(i) and i .
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• For all i > tnow, if Pα ∈ T Stnow (i), then EO(i) |= Pre(α) and duration(α) is defined
with respect to EO(i) and i .
Thus, if T Stnow(4) = {Doα,Fα}, then T Stnow cannot be deontically consistent. The
following definition explains what it means for a temporal status set to be closed under the
deontic modalities and under actions.
Definition 4.11 (Temporal deontic/Action closure). T Stnow is said to be temporally
deontically closed at time tnow if D-Cl(T Stnow(i))= T Stnow (i) for all time points i .
T Stnow is said to be temporally action closed at time tnow if A-Cl(T Stnow(i)) =
T Stnow(i) for all time points i .
Action consistency ensures that action constraints are never violated.
Definition 4.12 (Action consistency). T Stnow is said to be temporally action consistent
at time tnow if for all time points i such that acthisttnow(i) and histtnow(i) are defined,
Doi = {Doα | Doα ∈ T Stnow (i)} satisfies the action constraints with respect to the agent
state histtnow(i). 7
In the above definition, the reader should note that action consistency is checked only at
those time points for which the agent designer chose to save the agent state. The following
example illustrates this definition.
Example 4.13 (Rescue: action consistency). Let the truck agent have the action constraint
AC that intuitively saying that the tank agent cannot drive and fill fuel simultaneously.
Furthermore, let tnow = 3, let T Stnow and histtnow be the temporal status set and the
state history function from Example 4.4 respectively. Then T Stnow is temporally action
consistent since for all time points i  3, Doi satisfies AC with respect to histtnow(i). Note
that although Do4 does not satisfy AC, this does not alter the outcome since histtnow(4) is
not defined.
For a temporal status set to be feasible, whenever a checkpoint is encountered (and hence
the state of the agent is updated), the new state must satisfy the integrity constraints. That
is, the expected future states of the agent need to satisfy the integrity constraints. This
requirement, called checkpoint consistency, is defined below.
Definition 4.14 (Checkpoint consistency). T Stnow is said to be checkpoint consistent at
time tnow if for all i > tnow, EO(i) satisfies the integrity constraints IC.
It is important to note that every time a checkpoint is encountered, we must ensure that
all integrity constraints are satisfied. This means that at every checkpoint, we must ensure
that the concurrent execution of all actions of the form Doα at that time point does not
lead to a state which is inconsistent.
7 Note that for i = tnow both acthisttnow (i) and histtnow (i) are defined.
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For a temporal status set to be feasible, it must satisfy the additional requirement of state
consistency.
Definition 4.15 (State consistency). T Stnow is said to be state consistent at time tnow
if for all i  tnow such that histtnow(i) is defined, the state obtained from histtnow(i)
by concurrently applying all Do actions contained in T Stnow (i) satisfies the integrity
constraints IC.
Definition 4.16 (Feasible temporal status set). Suppose the current time is tnow, T P is a
tap, and histtnow ,acthisttnow are the state/action history respectively. Further suppose that
IC,AC are sets of integrity constraints and actions constraints, respectively. A set T Stnow
satisfying T Stnow (i) = ∅ for only finitely many i is said to be a feasible temporal status set
with respect to the above parameters if
(1) T Stnow is closed under the rules of T P ,
(2) T Stnow is temporally deontically and action consistent at time tnow,
(3) T Stnow is temporally deontically and action closed at time tnow,
(4) T Stnow is checkpoint consistent at time tnow,
(5) T Stnow is state consistent at time tnow,
(6) T Stnow is history compatible at time tnow.
4.3. Rational temporal status sets
A feasible temporal status set may contain action status atoms that are not necessary for
the temporal status set to be feasible. In this section, we identify a class of feasible status
sets for which agents perform a minimal set of actions.
Definition 4.17 (Rational feasible temporal status set). A temporal status set T Stnow is
grounded, if there is no temporal status set T S′tnow = T Stnow such that T S′tnow ⊆ T Stnow
and T S′tnow satisfies conditions (1)–(6) of a feasible temporal status set. 8
A temporal status set T Stnow is a rational temporal status set, if T Stnow is a feasible
status set and T Stnow is grounded.
Note that when T Stnow is a feasible status set, every T S′tnow ⊆ T Stnow satisfies
conditions (2), (5) in the definition of feasibility, and hence the above definition may be
simplified to only require satisfaction of conditions (1), (3), (4) and (6). The notion of a
rational temporal status set is illustrated via the following
Example 4.18 (Rescue: rational status set). Consider the simple example where the truck
agent has an action constraint as in Example 4.13, i.e., AC that intuitively saying that
the tank agent cannot drive and fill fuel simultaneously. In addition it has one integrity
constraint that intuitively says that the truck cannot simultaneously be at two different
locations. The agent’s tap contains exactly one rule specified at the end of Section 3.
8 T S′tnow ⊆ T Stnow if for all i, T S′tnow (i)⊆ T Stnow (i).
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Suppose the agent has the following very simple state history (histtnow ), and action history
(acthisttnow ) below:
histtnow(0)= {in(true, truck : tank_empty()), in(was, truck : location())},
histtnow(1)= {in(true, truck : tank_empty()), in(was, truck : location())},
acthisttnow(8)= {O drive(was,bal,hw95)}.
Suppose, tnow = 1. The following temporal status sets are feasible sets, but only the first
one is rational.
T S1tnow(1) = {O fill_fuel(),Do fill_fuel(),P fill_fuel()},
T S1tnow(8) = {O drive(was,bal,hw95),P drive(was,bal,hw95),
Do drive(was,bal,hw95)},
T S2tnow(1) = {O fill_fuel(),Do fill_fuel(),P fill_fuel(),
O order_item(fa_bag),Do order_item(fa_bag),
P order_item(fa_bag)},
T S2tnow(8) = {O drive(was,bal,hw95),P drive(was,bal,hw95),
Do drive(was,bal,hw95)}.
T S1tnow is temporally deontically consistent because(1) the only action which has a precondition is drive and it is easy to see that its
precondition, namely in(was, truck : location()) is satisfied by EO(8);
(2) for each T Stnow (i), there are no forbidden or waived actions.
T S1tnow is temporally action closed (and hence, temporally deontically closed) because for
each T S1tnow(i) where Oα ∈ T S1tnow(i), Doα ∈ T S1tnow (i) and Pα ∈ T S1tnow(i). T S1tnow
is temporally action consistent because there is no Doi where Do drive(From,To,
Highway), and Do fill_fuel() ∈ Doi . T S1tnow is checkpoint consistent as the only relevant
action, drive(was,bal,hw95), never violates the integrity constraints in IC. Finally, it is
easy to verify that T S1tnow is closed under the rule in T P .
Note that T S2tnow is also a feasible temporal status set: however, it contains Do order_item
(fa_bag) even though no rule or previous commitment forces order_item(fa_bag) to be
done. This prevents T S2tnow from being rational.
4.4. Compact representation of temporal status sets
Representing a feasible temporal status set explicitly is difficult because, for each time
point i , T Stnow(i) must be explicitly represented. This is obviously problematic from an
implementation point of view because i might be infinite, and representing actions for
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many such i’s is difficult and cumbersome. To ameliorate this problem, we describe below,
a constrained representation of a class of temporal feasible status sets.
Definition 4.19 (Temporal interval constraint tic). An atomic temporal interval constraint
is an expression of the form + t u where t is a variable ranging over natural numbers,
and +,u are natural numbers.
Temporal Interval Constraints are inductively defined as follows:
(1) Atomic temporal interval constraints are temporal interval constraints.
(2) If tic1, tic2 are temporal interval constraints involving the same variable t, then
(tic1 ∨ tic2), (tic1 & tic2) and ¬tic1 are temporal interval constraints.
For example, (5 t  10) is an atomic temporal interval constraint. So is (50 t  60).
In addition, (5 t  10) ∨ (50 t  60) and (5 t  10)& (50 t  60) are temporal
interval constraints.
As the concepts of constraints and solutions of constraints with variables ranging over
the natural numbers are well known and well studied in the literature [19], we do not repeat
them here.
Definition 4.20 (Interval constraint annotated status atom). If tic is a temporal interval
constraint, and Opα is an action status atom, then Opα : tic is an interval constraint
annotated status atom.
Intuitively, the interval constraint annotated status atom Opα : tic may be read as “Opα
is known to be true at some time point which is a solution of tic”. For example, Oα :
(500 t 6000) says that an agent is obliged to do α at one of times 500,501, . . .,6000.
If tic is an atomic temporal interval constraint, then we will sometimes write it as temporal
annotation, e.g., instead of Oα : (500 t 6000) we will write Oα : [500,6000].
Notice that one single statement allows us to implicitly represent the obligation of this
agent to do α at one of 5,501 time instances.
Definition 4.21 (Interval constraint temporal status set ic-T S). An interval constraint
temporal status set, denoted ic-T S, is a set of interval constraint annotated status atoms.
Such a set ic-T S stands for a whole class of temporal status sets: all status sets that are
compatible with it in the following sense:
Definition 4.22 (Temporal status sets compatible with ic-T S). A temporal status set
T Stnow is compatible with ic-T S if for every Opα :tic in ic-T S, there is a solution t= i of
tic such that Opα ∈ T Stnow(i).
We use the notation CompTSS(ic-T S) to denote the set of all temporal status sets
compatible with ic-T S.
The following example illustrates the connection between interval constraint temporal
status sets and temporal status sets.
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Example 4.23 (Rescue: compatibility). The status set T Stnow from Example 4.4 is com-
patible with the following ic-T S:
{P drive(was,bal,hw95) : (0 t 4),
O fill_fuel() : ((0 t 2)∨ (4 t 7)),
F fill_fuel() : (0 t 5)}.
There is an infinite number of temporal status sets T Stnow that are compatible with this
ic-T S. For example, the temporal status set, T S′tnow defined by T S′tnow (0)= {F fill_fuel()},T S′tnow(4) = {O fill_fuel(),P drive(was,bal,hw95)} is also compatible with it. On the
other hand, there are infinitely many interval constraint temporal status sets that are
compatible with the T Stnow from Example 4.4. The empty set is one example.
It is important to note that when we have two interval constraint annotated status atoms
of the form Opα :tic1 and Opα :tic2 in ic-T S, we cannot (in general) infer Opα :tic1 ∧ tic2.
We now define three important properties of an ic-T S—these definitions will be used in
the next section.
• ic-T S is temporally deontically consistent if there is a temporal status set T Stnow
compatible with ic-T S which is temporally deontically consistent.
• ic-T S is temporally deontically closed (respectively action closed) if there is a
temporal status set T Stnow compatible with ic-T S which is temporally deontically
(respectively action) closed.
Example 4.24. Consider the ic-T S of Example 5.2, i.e.,
{Do fill_fuel() : (3 t 3),P fill_fuel() : (3 t 3),
O order_item(fa_bag) : (3 t 7),P order_item(fa_bag) : (3 t 7),
Do order_item(fa_bag) : (3 t 7)}.
Suppose, tnow = 3, histtnow(0)= histtnow(1)= histtnow(2)= ∅ and
histtnow(3)= {in(1, truck : inventory(fa_bag)), in(true, truck : tank_empty())}.
This ic-T S is temporally deontically consistent and temporally deontically closed and
temporal action closed because the following T Stnow that is temporally deontically
consistent and temporally deontically and action closed is compatible with it.
For all i = 3, T Stnow(i)= ∅, and
T Stnow(3) = {Do fill_fuel(), P fill_fuel(), O order_item(fa_bag),
P order_item(fa_bag), Do order_item(fa_bag)}.
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5. Status set computation algorithm for positive taps
The preceding section defines a formal semantics based on the concept of a feasible
temporal status set. We now show how such sets can be constructed. Our main result is
Theorem 5.11 stating that Algorithm 5.1 to compute such sets for positive taps (i.e., taps
whose rules are negation-free) is correct and complete. As this result is complex and needs
sophisticated technical machinery, we first present an overview of the proof.
In Section 5.1 we show that the main difficulty is to ensure that the set to be constructed
is closed under the rules of T P . This is because when a rule causes atoms to be added
to T Stnow(i), for some i  tnow, it may cause other rules to fire, which may cause other
atoms to be added to T Stnow(i), for some i  tnow. This in turn may cause additional rules
to fire.
This difficulty suggests taking advantage of well-known methods from logic program-
ming [48], namely to construct a suitable monotone fixpoint operator (Definition 5.1) and
to relate its least fixpoint DT P ↑ω with feasible temporal status sets (Theorem 5.6). The
iterative construction of this fixpoint is nothing but a mathematical description of the well
known “loop” construct in programming languages. These methods allow us to mathemat-
ically model the transitive closure of forward chaining rules in an elegant way. For readers
not familiar with this approach, we add some explanations. The fixpoint operator of Defi-
nition 5.1 applied to a set ic-T S gives us the result of applying all the rules at once. Thus,
to get the transitive closure, we have to iterate this operator. We are therefore interested in
its least fixpoint, if it exists: this fixpoint would then constitute the transitive closure of all
the rules. The existence of this fixpoint follows immediately, using the famous theorem of
Knaster/Tarski [72], because the operator itself is monotone.
In Section 5.2 we use the results of Section 5.1 to design Algorithm 5.1 to compute
feasible temporal status sets. The main ingredient used in this algorithm is ComputeTSS,
which computes status sets compatible with a given ic-T S. The ic-T S we start with is
the fixed point of the rules, DT P ↑ω . To ensure important properties of ComputeTSS
(Definition 5.7), we introduce Constraint Hitting Sets (Definition 5.8).
5.1. Fixpoint operator acting on ic-T S’s
Suppose the current time, tnow and the histories, histtnow(·) and acthisttnow(·) are
arbitrary, but fixed.
(1) History compatibility uniquely specifies T Stnow (i) for i < tnow.
(2) If there exists an i < tnow for which state consistency does not hold, then no feasible
temporal status set can exist.
Thus we are left with the construction of T Stnow (i) for i  tnow which should be based
on the last condition for feasibility: the “closure under program rules”. The question is
whether we can satisfy this condition while making sure that all the other conditions are
also satisfied.
When considering a program rule, we need to distinguish between two types of tasc that
appear in the body of the rule:
(i) state dependent tasc,
(ii) state independent tasc.
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A state dependent tasc is always evaluated either in the current or the past. Thus,
every state dependent tasc of the form ! : [tai1, tai2] may implicitly be rewritten as
! : [tai1,min(tai2,tnow)].
If tai2 < tnow, then evaluation of ! : [tai1, tai2] boils down checking if ! is true at some
time point i < tnow. Thus, all that is needed is to evaluate ! with respect to the state at
time i < tnow and T Stnow(i) both of which are fixed! If the body is true and the head is of
the form Opα : ta, then T Stnow(j) must contain Opα for some time point j ∈ ta such that
j  tnow.
Hence, it is only if tai2 = tnow that we need to worry about evaluating the rule with
respect to state dependent tascs. The main problem is therefore to compute the set
T Stnow(tnow): Adding more and more action status atoms to T Stnow(tnow) forces us to
reconsider program rules that already fired and thus to extend the set T Stnow(tnow)! This
is exactly where the fixpoint character of the computation comes in.
With respect to state independent tascs, we note that according to the intuitive reading
after Definition 3.10 there is no requirement that rules only fire from up to now into
the future (including now). Therefore rules of the form Opα : [tnow,tnow] ← Opα :
[tnow + 5,tnow + 5] are allowed. This, of course, adds another fixpoint flavor to the
computation of temporal status sets.
Thus, in order to find a closure under program rules, we will define a fixpoint
operator. In this definition we will distinguish between dependent and independent tasc’s
to reflect our discussion above. This definition assumes that implication of modalities
is defined as follows: O implies P and Do, Do implies P and for every Op, Op
implies Op.
Definition 5.1 (Operator DT P ). Suppose T P is a tap, histtnow(tnow) is an agent state and
ic-T S is an interval constraint temporal status set. Then we define DT P (ic-T S) to be the
set
{Op′ α : tic | Opα : [tai1, tai2] ← !1 : ta1 & · · ·&!n : tan
is a ground instance of a rule in T P and for all 1 i  n
(I) If !i is state independent
(we assume !i=Opi1 αi1 ∧ · · · ∧Opin αim )
If m= 1 then there exists Op′i1 αi1 : tici1 in ic-T S such that:
(1) Op′i1 implies Opi1 ,
(2) tici1 implies t ∈ tai1 (i.e., all solutions of tici1 are in tai1 ).
If m> 1 then there exist ti ∈ tai and Op′ij αij : [ti, ti] in ic-T S
such that Op′ij implies Opij .
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(II) If !i is state dependent
(we assume !i=χi ∧Opi1 αi1 ∧ · · · ∧Opin αim )
If m= 0 then
(0) χi is true in the agent state histtnow(ti), for a ti  tnow and
(1) ti is a solution of tai .
If m 1 then there exist ti  tnow and Op′ij αij : [ti, ti]
in ic-T S such that:
(0) χi is true in the agent state histtnow(ti ),
(1) Op′ij implies Opij ,
(2) ti is a solution of tai .
and tic= [max {tai1,tnow}, tai2] and Op implies Op′.
}
Intuitively, the input to this operator contains things we already know must be in a
feasible temporal status set. The output computes what else must be added to the feasible
temporal status set if all rules in T P are applied just once.
As discussed above, we distinguish between state dependent and state independent tasc’s
in the operator above because:
(1) For state independent tasc’s, we do not need to ensure that the body of a rule is
evaluated in the past (as we do not have a condition on the state which needs to be
checked).
(2) However, state dependent tasc’s have an associated state condition which can only
be checked up to tnow. Therefore, in this case, we only need to worry about the
current time, tnow.
In addition, in each category we distinguish between cases in which the tasc consists of
only one disjunct, and cases in which the tasc consists of at least two disjuncts.
The first case is much easier to satisfy. If !i is a state-independent tasc, and if it consists
of only one conjunct (i.e., m = 1), it is of the form Opi1 αi1 : ta1, e.g., Pα : [tnow + 1,
tnow + 5]. For it to be satisfied, there must be an interval constraint annotated status atom,
Op′i1 αi1 : tici1 that will lead to its satisfaction. As tici1 may be satisfied by several solutions,
and we are not sure which of them will eventually be selected, we must verify that for every
choice of a solution of tici1 , it will entail the satisfaction of !i . For this we require that all
the solutions of tici1 will be members of ta1. For Pα : [tnow + 1,tnow + 5], tici1 can be,
for example, tnow + 2  t  tnow + 4. On the other hand, we have some flexibility with
respect to the operator Op′i1 of the constraint atom. Since we aim at constructing a feasible
temporal status set, we know that it will be temporally deontically and action closed, and
thus we can allow that Op′i1 will not be equal to Opi1 , but only will imply it. In our example
it can be Oα[tnow + 2,tnow + 4].
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The case of in which !i is a state- dependent tasc and consists of only one conjunct (i.e.,
m= 0) is even more simple. It is of the form, χi : tai and it cannot be satisfied in the future
as we require in the definition.
The cases in which the tasc consists of at least two conjuncts is more complex. All
the conjuncts must be satisfied in the same time period in order that the tasc will be
satisfied. Therefore, we require that there is one time period ti ∈ tai such that there is
an interval constraint annotated status atom of the form Op′ij αij : [ti, ti]. For example,
if !i = (Pα1 ∧ Oα2) : [3,7], then in order that it will be satisfied, ic-T S may include
Oα1[4,4] and Oα2[4,4].
In all the above cases, as our goal is to construct T Stnow(i) for i  tnow, the lower
bound of the time interval of the atom that we add, Op′ α : tic is not smaller than tnow as
stated in the last line of the definition. We demonstrate the usage of the operator in the next
definition.
Example 5.2 (Rescue: DT P ). Suppose the truck agent’s tap, T P , contains rules (r2) and
(r3) from Example 4.4 which are recapitulated below:
r2: Do fill_fuel() : [tnow,tnow]←
in(true, truck : tank_empty()) : [tnow − 2,tnow].
r3: O order_item(fa_bag) : [tnow,tnow + 4]←
in(1, truck : inventory(fa_bag))[tnow − 3,tnow].
Suppose, tnow = 3 and
histtnow(tnow) = {in(1, truck : inventory(fa_bag)),
in(true, truck : tank_empty())},
DT P (∅) = {Do fill_fuel() : (3 t 3),P fill_fuel() : (3 t 3),
O order_item(fa_bag) : (3 t 7),
P order_item(fa_bag) : (3 t 7),
Do order_item(fa_bag) : (3 t 7)}.
In order to find a fixed point we need to iterate the operator. However, we do not start the
operator at ∅: this is because part of the temporal status set we want to construct is already
determined by acthisttnow(·). Therefore we define
ic-T Sstart :=
⋃
{i such that acthistnow(i) is defined}
{Opα[i, i] : Opα ∈ acthisttnow(i)}.
In most of the examples below, we assume without loss of generality that acthisttnow(·)
is empty and thus ic-T Sstart = ∅.
Definition 5.3 (Iterations of DT P ). Let T P be a positive tap, and histtnow(tnow) be an
agent state. The iterations of DT P are defined as follows:
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DT P ↑0= ic-T Sstart.
DT P ↑(j+1)= DT P (DT P ↑j ).
DT P ↑ω=
⋃
j
DT P ↑j .
The following example demonstrates how we may iterate the DT P operator.
Example 5.4 (Rescue: DT P ). We continue with Example 5.2 and assume that the agent’s
state is as described there, acthisttnow(·) is empty, and thus ic-T Sstart = ∅. In addition to
rules r2 and r3 mentioned there, we assume that we have two additional rules in the agent’s
tap T P :
r0: F drive(was,bal,Highway) : [Xnow,Xnow + 2] ←
Do fill_fuel() & in(true, truck : tank_empty()) : [Xnow,Xnow + 2].
r1: O drive(was,bal,hw95) : [Xnow + 5,Xnow + 10] ←
O order_item(fa_bag) : [Xnow,Xnow + 10].
• DT P ↑0= ∅ since ic-T Sstart = ∅.
• DT P ↑(1)= DT P (DT P ↑0)= DT P (∅). The additional two rules in T P didn’t change
the set DT P (∅), and it is as in Example 5.2, i.e.,
DT P ↑(1) = {Do fill_fuel() (3 t 3),P fill_fuel() (3 t 3),
O order_item(fa_bag) (3 t 7),
P order_item(fa_bag) (3 t 7),
Do order_item(fa_bag) (3 t 7)}.
• Applying the rules r0 and r1, in addition to r2 and r3, we get:
DT P ↑(2) = DT P ↑(1) ∪
{F drive(was,bal,hw95) : (3 t  5) ,
F drive(was,bal,hw295) : (3 t  5) ,
O drive(was,bal,hw95) : (8 t  13),
Do drive(was,bal,hw95) : (8 t  13) ,
P drive(was,bal,hw95) : (8 t  13)}.
• For all j > 2, DT P ↑(j)= DT P ↑(2).
• DT P ↑ω= DT P ↑(2).
We have proved that DT P is a monotone and continuous operator [26] and that DT P ↑ω
is its least fixpoint. This is an application of the Knaster–Tarski theorem in universal
algebra.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose T P is a positive tap, and histtnow (tnow) is an agent state. Then:
DT P ↑ω is the least fixpoint of DT P .
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We are now ready to show that DT P ↑ω has the properties of temporal deontic and action
closure, and also that all feasible temporal status sets must be compatible with DT P ↑ω .
These properties will later help us in computing feasible temporal status sets.
Theorem 5.6. Suppose T P is a positive tap, and histtnow (tnow) is an agent state. Then:
(1) DT P ↑ω is temporally deontically closed.
(2) DT P ↑ω is temporally action closed.
(3) If T Stnow is a feasible temporal status set, then it is compatible with DT P ↑ω.
5.2. Feasible temporal status set algorithm
The net result of the above theorem is that in order to find feasible temporal status sets
we can
(1) compute the least fixpoint of DT P and then
(2) select from amongst the compatible temporal status sets, those that satisfy the other
requirements for feasibility.
Algorithm 5.1 uses a subroutine called ComputeTSS described later in Definition 5.7.
Whenever an agent’s state changes, this algorithm will be executed to find a new feasible
temporal status set. The agent then concurrently executes all actions α such that Doα is in
the computed feasible temporal status set at time tnow. The algorithm works by iteratively
modifying the set T Stnow (using the ComputeTSS subroutine) and checking for feasibility.
Algorithm 5.1 (Feasible temporal status set computation).
FTSS(tnow, T P , histtnow , acthisttnow )
(. input is the current time, a positive tap T P .)
(. and the histories histtnow , acthisttnow .)
(. output is a feasible temporal status set if one exists .)
(. otherwise, the output is “No”. .)
(1) if Check_trivial_part(histtnow , acthisttnow )= false then return “No”.
(2) done := false;
(3) Seen := ∅;
(4) while ¬done do
(a) T Stnow := ComputeTSS(DT P ↑ω ,T P , Seen);
(b) if T Stnow = “No” then return “No”.
(c) if FeasTSS(T Stnow) then done := true else Seen := Seen ∪ {T Stnow};
(5) return T Stnow .
The FTSS algorithm terminates as soon as a feasible temporal status set is found.
The Check_trivial_part subroutine determines T Stnow(i) for i < tnow by history
compatibility and then checks checkpoint consistency and state consistency for T Stnow(i)
for i < tnow. If either of them is not satisfied, it returns falseand there is no compatible set
(see the explanations at the beginning of the previous section).
The algorithm maintains a set, Seen, of compatible temporal status sets seen thus far—
if the algorithm is “still running” this means that none of the compatible temporal status
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sets examined thus far is feasible, and hence, we need to continue trying to find a new
compatible temporal status set that is feasible.
As ComputeTSS computes compatible status sets that are closed under the rules of the
program, the FeasTSS algorithm only needs to check
(1) action consistency for T Stnow(tnow),
(2) whether all the operators Opα in T Stnow where Op ∈ {P,O,Do} are executable in
the current state histtnow(tnow),
(3) temporal deontic consistency for T Stnow(tnow). (As we require temporal status sets
to be finite, we only need to check this for finitely many i .)
(4) checkpoint consistency for T Stnow(tnow). (As we require the number of checkpoints
to be finite, we only need to check this for finitely many i .)
It returns true if all the requirements are met—otherwise it returns false.
We now present a detailed algorithm for ComputeTSS. Before doing so, we first
formulate the input-output behaviour of this function.
Definition 5.7 (Input and Output of ComputeTSS). The ComputeTSS function takes as
input (1) an interval constraint temporal status set ic-T S, (2) a positive temporal program
T P , and (3) a set Seen of temporal status sets closed under the rules of T P .
It either returns a temporal status set closed under the rules of T P , compatible with
ic-T S, and different from the sets in Seen, if such a set exists, or “No” (if no such temporal
status set exists).
We have to construct a temporal status set T Stnow compatible with ic-T S and closed
under the rules of T P . How can we accomplish this? Obviously, if an atom of the form
Opα : [4,4] is in ic-T S we have to put Opα into T Stnow (4). But all other atoms consisting
of non-singleton tic’s must also be satisfied. How can we assign them to T Stnow ? To
obtain compatibility, for every such Opα : tic we must add at least one atom of the
form Opα : [i, i] where i is a solution of tic. However, we should choose i carefully so
as to maintain closure under the program rules and to ensure minimality. For a precise
description of how to make such a choice, let us introduce the concept of a constraint
hitting set.
Definition 5.8 (Constraint hitting set). Suppose ic-T S is an interval constraint temporal
status set. A constraint hitting set, H , for ic-T S is a minimal set of ground annotated atoms
of the form Opα : [i, i] such that:
For every interval constraint annotated status atom Opα : tic ∈ ic-T S, there is an
annotated atom of the form Opα : [i, i] in H such that i is a solution of tic, and if
i < tnow, then Opα ∈ acthisttnow(i).
We use chs(ic-T S) to denote the set of all constraint hitting sets for ic-T S.
We will use a subroutine called find_member_chs(ic-T S,Seen) which finds a member
of chs(ic-T S) that is not in Seen. If no such element exists, it returns “No solution”. We
do not specify the implementation of this algorithm as it can be easily implemented (using
standard hitting set algorithms [19]).
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Our algorithm for ComputeTSS systematically tries to satisfy the status atoms by first
computing a hitting set. There are two possibilities:
(1) There is no such hitting set that does not appear already in Seen. If this happens,
then the ic-T S we started with cannot be extended to a temporal status set closed
under the rules of T P and still compatible with ic-T S.
(2) There is such a hitting set H .
Such a hitting set H will serve us as a starting point to compute a temporal status set. Note
that H can already be seen as a temporal status set compatible with ic-T S. The problem is
that it is not closed under the rules of T P .
Before elaborating further on how ComputeTSS may be implemented, we need one
more concept.
Definition 5.9 (Solution closed). A set F of interval constrained annotated atoms is said
to be solution-closed iff:
for all interval constrained annotated status atoms Opα : tic ∈ F,
the following holds: tic has a solution i and Opα : [i, i] ∈ F .
Intuitively, a set F is solution-closed if for every interval constrained annotated status
atoms Opα : tic in F , some explicit Opα : [i, i] is also in F where i is a solution of tic.
Given this requirement, another problem is that the ic-T S with which we started is the
least fixpoint of the DT P operator. Thus it contains status atoms that violate the solution-
closed requirement. We use the hitting set H to get rid of them. H chooses appropriate
times for status atoms with annotations that include more than one time point. We add these
atoms to the program and get a new program T Pnew (see (2)(d)(ii)(A) in Algorithm 5.2).
We then apply our operator DT P to T Pnew (see (2)(d)(ii)(B) in Algorithm 5.2). Note that
new atoms which violate the solution-closed requirement may still be generated. We repeat
this process until either
(1) all constraint atoms have a solution in the current H ∗ (see (2)(d)(ii)(C) in
Algorithm 5.2), or
(2) we reach a fixpoint H ∗. This fixpoint yields a better candidate ic-T Snew and we have
to re-iterate the whole process, by first computing a hitting set of ic-T Snew and then
computing the iterations of our operator DT P .
Algorithm 5.2 (ComputeTSS(ic-T S,T P,Seen)).
ComputeTSS(ic-T S,T P,Seen)
(. input is a positive tap T P .)
(. an interval constraint temporal status set ic-T S .)
(. and a set Seen of temporal status sets .)
(. output is a compatible temporal status set not in Seen .)
(. which is closed under the rules of T P .)
(1) done := false; found := false; Loc_Seen := Seen;
ic-T Snew := ic-T S; H ∗ := ∅, done_inner := false;
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(2) while ¬done ∧ ¬found do
(a) if done_inner then
(i) H = find_member_chs(ic-T S,Loc_Seen);
(ii) if H = “No” then done := true;
(iii) done_inner := false
(b) else
(i) H = find_member_chs(ic-T Snew,Loc_Seen);
(ii) if H = “No” then done_inner = true;
(c) Loc_Seen := Loc_Seen∪ {H };
(d) if H = “No” then
(i) H. =H ; changed =true;
(ii) while ¬found ∧ changed do
(A) T Pnew = T P ∪ H.; oldH. =H.;
(B) H. = DT Pnew ;
(C) if H. /∈ Loc_Seen ∧ H. is solution closed
then found = true
else changed = (oldH. =H.);
(iii) Loc_Seen := Loc_Seen∪ {H ∗}; ic-T Snew :=H ∗
(3) if found then return H. else return “No”.
There are two while loops in the algorithm above. The outer loop (step (2) of the
algorithm), considers the possible hitting sets of the original ic-T S. The variable “done” is
false as long as not all the hitting sets were considered.
For each hitting set of the original ic-T S, the inner while loop (2d(ii) of the algorithm),
tries to find a solution-closed superset H ∗ of the hitting set. This is done using DT P after
adding the hitting set to T P and assigning it to T Pnew (2d(ii)B). It iteratively adds the
result of applying DT P to T P (2d(ii)A). When H ∗ cannot be enlarged any more and still
a solution wasn’t found, a hitting set of H ∗ (which is assigned to ic-T Snew (2d(iii)) is
found (2b(i)) and the process continues until success or until it is clear that the chosen H
can’t be extended any more.
The following lemma states that the above implementation of Algorithm 5.2 satisfies the
output conditions of Definition 5.7.
Lemma 5.10. Suppose the find_member_chs(ic-T Snew,Loc_Seen) algorithm is correctly
implemented. Then:
(1) If algorithm ComputeTSS returns a temporal status set H ∗, then H ∗ satisfies the
output conditions of Definition 5.7.
(2) If algorithm ComputeTSS returns “No”, then there is no temporal status set
satisfying the output conditions of Definition 5.7.
Theorem 5.11 (Algorithm 5.1 is correct and complete). Algorithm 5.1 generates a
feasible temporal status set (if one exists).
Proof. Suppose Algorithm 5.1 returns T Stnow . In this case, T Stnow is compatible via
step (4)(a), and feasible via step (4)(c).
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Conversely, suppose Algorithm 5.1 returns “No”. In this case, we know that Find-
CompTSS returned “No” which means that it was unable to find a temporal status set com-
patible with DT P ↑ω . But this means that all temporal status set compatible with DT P ↑ω
are in Seen which means none of them is feasible. ✷
We note that the set generated by ComputeTSS is not minimal, i.e., there might be
smaller sets closed under the rules which are compatible with ic-T S. The reason is that the
generated hitting set might not have been optimal. As an illustration, we consider the ic-T S
consisting of Pα : [1,2], Pα : [3,4], and the program Pα : [1,1]← Pα : [2,2]& Pα : [4,4].
If we start with the wrong hitting set, namely {Pα : [2,2],Pα : [4,4]}, ComputeTSS
produces H ∗ = {Pα : [1,1],Pα : [2,2],Pα : [4,4]}. But if we start with a subset of H ∗,
namely {Pα : [1,1],Pα : [4,4]}, then this is a minimal status set closed under the rules and
compatible with ic-T S. It is easy to modify Algorithm 5.2 to take this into account. We
can either compute all solutions and check for minimality, or we can take a solution and
compute a hitting set different from the one we started with. We then call ComputeTSS on
this new hitting set. The result could be a smaller solution than originally obtained. This is
stated in the next remark.
Remark 5.1 (Rational temporal status set computation). A slight modification of the
ComputeTSS subroutine allows for the computation of rational status sets. Namely if
we require the computed set of Algorithm 5.7 to be minimal while being closed under T P ,
and compatible with ic-T S, and change Definition 5.7 accordingly, then Algorithm 5.1
generates a rational feasible temporal status set (if one exists). The proof is literally the
same. The fact that the outcome is rational follows from the minimality requirements in
ComputeTSS.
Once the rational temporal status sets are known, the feasible status sets are easily
obtained by adding new action atoms and then applying the ComputeTSS function. This
is because each feasible status set is an extension of its underlying rational status set.
Remark 5.2. Note that we required a temporal status set to satisfy T Stnow(i) = ∅ for only
finitely many i . It is easy to write programs where FindCompTSS never terminates but
yet such a finite temporal status set does not exist. For example, consider the simple loop
Pα : [t + 1, t + 1] ← meaning that for all i: Pα ∈ T Stnow (i).
It is obvious that in general, the complexity introduced by the subroutine ComputeTSS
is very high. The underlying source is reasoning by cases which is known to be of high
complexity. A possible remedy (which is beyond the scope of this paper) is to consider
special classes of programs and to show that for these classes, the function ComputeTSS
can be realized with low overall complexity.
6. Application of taps: intention reconciliation by collaborative agents
In this section, we present a multiagent application of temporal agent programs involving
time. The example describes how different agents reconcile existing commitments to a
group with new requests/opportunities. More applications can be found in [26].
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Many applications have been proposed that require individual agents to work collabo-
ratively to satisfy a shared goal [23,62,71]. In these settings, agents form teams to carry
out actions, making commitments to their group’s activity and to their individual actions in
service of that activity. As rational agents, the individuals who form teams must be able to
make individually rational decisions about their commitments and plans. As members of
a team, they must be responsible to the team and, dually, be able to count on one another.
In particular, there are many factors that an agent needs to take into consideration when
confronted with a request to perform an individual action γ which conflicts with prior
commitment to perform a group action β .
In [69,70] such factors were studied and tested in a simulation environment called SPIRE
(SharedPlans Intention-Reconciliation Experiments). In this environment, a team of agents
(g1, . . . , gn) work together on group activities, called GroupTasks, each of which consists
of doing a set of tasks. Each task has a specified time period and is assigned to one of
the agents in the group by a central scheduling function that has complete knowledge of
agents’ defaulting behavior. Agents receive income for the tasks they do which can be used
in determining an agent’s current utility and in estimating its future-expected utility.
Sometimes, agents, are offered the opportunity to do some action γ that conflicts with a
task β they have been assigned. If the agent chooses the new opportunity, it defaults on the
task β with which γ conflicts. If there is an available replacement agent that is capable of
doing β , the task is given to that agent; otherwise, β goes undone. The group as a whole
incurs a cost whenever an agent defaults, and this cost is divided equally among the group’s
members. The cost of a particular default depends on its impact on the group; it is larger if
there is no replacement.
SPIRE currently uses a social-commitment policy (SCP) in which a portion of each
agent’s weekly tasks is assigned based on how “responsible” it has been over the course of
the simulation. When an agent needs to make a decision whether to keep its commitment
to the group (i.e., do β) or default and do the outside option, γ it weighs the impact of the
choice on three factors: current income (CI), future expected income (FEI) given the SCP
(i.e., effect on ranking and subsequent task assignment), and loss of good-guy stature in the
community independent of effect on income (BP). For each option, it combines the three
factors into an expected utility value using normalization methods of multiple attribute
decision making theory [75] and choose the option with the highest expected utility.
SPIRE is a simulation environment and only simulates agent decision making, but does
not provide tools for creating and deploying such agents. In this section we demonstrate
how such agents can be programmed using tap.
We associate with each agent, a specialized package called utility that supports the
following functions in order to compute its expected utility. Such a package can be easily
implemented in the IMPACT agent development environment [31] and agent developers
can choose to use it if their agent needs to perform intention reconciliation of the sort
described in SPIRE.
• utility : current_income(A,Rep)→ Real
current_income takes as input, an action and a flag. The flag indicates, in case that
the action is an outside option, whether there is a replacement if the agent defaults on
its current assigned action in order to do the specified action. The function returns the
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income from the task or outside offer, as well as the agent’s share of the group cost if
it defaults.
• utility : future_e_income(A,Rep)→ Real
future_e_income takes as input, an action and a “replacement” flag and returns the
agent’s estimate of its income in the future, based on its current ranking if it will do
A.
• utility : brownie_points(A,Repl)→ Real
brownie_points takes as input, an action and a “replacement” flag and provides a
measure of the agent’s sense of its reputation as a responsible collaborator if it does A
under the specified conditions.
• utility : combine_factors(A,CI,FEI,BP)→ Real
combine_factors combines the three factors that the agent should take into consider-
ation when making a decision, and computes the expected utility of the agents from
doing A. The combination is done using normalization methods of multiple attribute
decision making theory [75].
We associate with each agent, an additional specialized package called schedule that
supports the code call listed below and others that determine its schedule.
• schedule : check(T)→ Actions
check returns the action (to be precise the name of an action together with its
arguments) that the agent is scheduled to do in the specified time, if such an action
exist, and null, otherwise.
The msgbox package is discussed in depth in [68]. We now extend it by adding the
following code calls:
• msgbox : gather_outside_req()→{〈Actions,Time〉}
gather_outside_req returns pairs of an action and a time period of outside offers.
• msgbox : check_replacement(T)→ Boolean
check_replacement takes a time period as input, and returns whether there is an agent
who is available at this time period.
Here are a few rules that can be used to program agents in SPIRE.
r1 (Schema for actions α ∈Actions):
Oα : [Xnow,Xnow] ← in("α", schedule : check(Xnow)) : [Xnow,Xnow].
This represents a schema of rules: an instance is obtained by substituting the
metavariable α with a particular action act(x) (the tuple x represents the arguments) from
a prespecified finite set Actions. We denote by "α" respectively by "act(x)" the string
consisting of the complete name of the action together with the arguments (we consider
such strings as constants in the underlying language).
The agent is obliged to do an action α if it is in its schedule when the action time arrives.
r2: O removeAction(Y) : [Xnow,Xnow] ←
( Do addAction(Y,T)& in(Y, schedule : check(T)) ) : [Xnow,Xnow].
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The agent maintains the consistency of its schedule. It is obliged to remove Y from its
schedule if it adds a conflicting action (in SPIRE, an agent cannot have more than one task
at a time in its schedule).
r3: P addAction(Y,T) : [Xnow,Xnow] ←
( in(〈Y,T〉, msgbox : gather_outside_req())&
in(null, schedule : check(T))
) : [Xnow,Xnow].
The agent is permitted to add an action to its schedule if it was requested to do it and it
does not conflict with its other scheduled actions.
r4: P addAction(Y,T) : [Xnow,Xnow] ←
( in(〈Y,T〉, msgbox : gather_outside_req()) &
in(Y1, schedule : check(T)) & = (Y1, Y ) &
in(X,msgbox : check_replacement(T)) &
in(CI, utility : current_income(Y,X)) &
in(FEI, utility : future_e_income(Y,X)) &
in(BP, utility : brownie_points(Y,X)) &
in(U, utility : combine_factors(Y,CI,FEI,BP)) &
in(CI′, utility : current_income(Y1,"na"))&
in(FEI′, utility : future_e_income(Y1),"na") &
in(BP′, utility : brownie_points(Y1,"na")) &
in(U′, utility : combine_factors(Y1,CI′,FEI′,BP′)) &
> (U,U′)
) : [Xnow,Xnow].
The agent is permitted to add a new action Y to its schedule, even if it conflicts with
another action, Y1, if its expected utility from Y is larger than its expected utility from Y1.
In order to compute the expected utility of an action the agent computes its current income,
future expected income and its brownie points from doing the action.
r5: O SendAnnouncement(scheduler,"default", 〈X,T〉) : [Xnow,Xnow] ←
Do removeAction(X,T) : [Xnow + 1,Xnow + 1].
If the agent intends to remove a collaborative action from its schedule, it is obliged to
announce the scheduler agent about its intention.
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7. Related work
As we have already described some relevant work in the introduction, in this section, we
either describe details of (some of) that work and also present some other related work.
Temporal reasoning. MetaTem and Concurrent MetaTem [9,34] start with the notion of
literal in classical first order logic and define well formed formulas (wffs) inductively via
usage of connectives such as © (next time), ✸ (eventually), ✷ (forever), © (previous
time instance) plus some variants. It is known that all MetaTem rules can be encoded in a
syntactic fragment consisting of the following four types of rules (cf. [34]).
(1) Initial ✷-rules have the form “Disjunction of literals is true at the start time”. In
taps, if we wish to express that a disjunction of status literals (Op1 a1 ∨ · · · ∨
Opm am ∨ ¬Opm+1 am+1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Opm+n am+n) is true, then we can use either
the feasible (or rational) temporal status set semantics and write it as the rule
Op1a1 : [Xnow,Xnow]←¬Op2 a2 : [Xnow,Xnow] ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Opm am : [Xnow,Xnow] ∧
Opm+1 am+1 : [Xnow,Xnow] ∧ · · · ∧ Opm+n am+n : [Xnow,Xnow]. (Note that if the
reasonable status set semantics of [30] is used, then this would not be true.)
(2) Global ✷-rules have the form “If a conjunction of literals was true at the previous
time instance (and such a previous time instance existed), then a disjunction of
literals is true now”. This can be expressed using the same rule as above except
that the condition is added to the rule body.
(3) Initial ✷-rules which say that in the initial state ✷+ is true (which of course means
that that literal + is true “now” and in all future states). When + is positive, this can be
expressed via the tap rules + : [0,0] ← and + : [X+ 1,X+ 1]← + : [X,X]. When
we have a negation literal + = ¬a then we may express this via the rules (using
a new “artificial” status atom a′) a′ : [0,0] ←, a′ : [X + 1,X + 1] ← a′ : [X,X]
and a : [X,Y ] ← ¬a′ : [X,Y ] and using the rational temporal status set semantics
(feasible will not work in this case).
(4) Global ✸-rules have the form “If a conjunction of literals was true at the previous
time instance (and such a previous time instance existed), then ✷+ is true now”.
These can be expressed via taps as + : [Xnow+X,Xnow+X]← C : [Xnow−1,Xnow−
1] where C is the desired conjunction and + is assumed to be positive. If + = ¬a
is negative, then we use the rational temporal status set semantics and use the rules
a′ : [Xnow+X,Xnow+X]← C : [Xnow−1,Xnow−1] and a : [X,Y ]←¬a′ : [X,Y ].
As shown above, each of the four types of rules above in MetaTem can be expressed via
taps.
Parts of ordinary agent programs [30] can also be expressed via MetaTem under some
conditions. For instance, in ordinary agent programming, Pα can be written as✷¬α if there
exists an action ¬α corresponding that reverses the effects of action α. Likewise, Doα can
be expressed as ©α indicating that α is done at the next time instance. One may encode
Oα as ©oblα where oblα is a special action with no preconditions and/or effects, saying
that the “dummy” action α is obligatory. However, the syntax and techniques for accessing
heterogeneous and/or legacy data sources in IMPACT are unique and are not included in
MetaTem, though this is not impossible. In addition, the syntax of taps allows arguments
to become temporal parameters as shown via the two examples in the Introduction of this
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paper. In general, speaking strictly in logical terms, it is hard in temporal logic to say
things like “If p(X,Y ) holds, then do α f (X,Y ) time units from now”. The reason is that
in MetaTem, we cannot dynamically infer the number of occurrences of the © modality at
run-time.
On the flip side, MetaTem and Concurrent MetaTem have studied things we have
not studied, e.g., the interaction of temporal agents and belief structures [36] and the
development of proof procedures for full fledged fragments of their calculus, while our
methods compute status sets for positive taps only. This provides a rich avenue for future
research.
In addition, there is the issue of determining when to use a MetaTem style language
for temporal agent reasoning, and when to use a tap-style formalism. If heterogeneous
data sources are involved, then taps clearly offer a principled way of dealing with them.
Furthermore, if time computations depend upon the values of variables which are only
available dynamically after deployment of the agent, as in the cases involving the shipping
schedules mentioned in Section 1, then taps again offer a clean solution. However, in
cases where one models purely logical phenomena where data structures and legacy code
bases are not an issue, then MetaTem may offer advantages. For instance, the Snow White
example in [34] can be easily expressed both in MetaTem and via taps—which one is
preferable depends on the user’s level of comfort with each. In this example, Snow White
hands out sweets to different dwarves, each of whom has a different strategy for asking for
sweets. The dwarf eager asks for a sweet at time 0 and then asks for another whenever he
receives one. This can be modeled by having eager’s tap contain the rules:
Do ask_for_sweet() : [0,0] ←
Do ask_for_sweet() : [T+ 1,T+ 1] ← (in(X, eager : getmessage())&
= (X.content,"You get a sweet.")&
= (X.from,"Snow White")&
= (X.to, ‘"eager")) : [T,T].
Here, eager has a rule saying that if he receives a message from Snow White saying
he has been awarded a sweet at time T, then he immediately asks for another sweet
at time T + 1. This model assumes (as does Fisher’s example) that all dwarves see all
messages being exchanged. Likewise, the dwarf mimic asks for a sweet whenever he
knows eager asked for one. This can be modeled by having mimic’s tap contain the
rule:
Do ask_for_sweet() : [T+ 1,T+ 1] ← (in(X,mimic : getmessage())&
= (X.content,"Request a sweet"))&
= (X.from,"eager")&
= (X.to,"Snow White")) : [T,T].
In a similar vein, we can encode the behavior of all the dwarves and Snow White as well.
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Brzoska [14] introduced a temporal logic framework, metric temporal logic, and showed
how this can be translated into Prolog programs with constraints, such that satisfiability
checking of the constraints can be done in time linear in the variables. He uses modal
operators like ✷ and ✸ and temporal annotations. Although we use only the ✸ operator,
the ✷ operator can be easily expressed. We are more expressive in that our annotations can
be arbitrary terms containing variables, whereas Brzoska’s are fixed. In principle, our status
sets can be seen as consisting of successfully derived goals (in Brzoska’s terminology), but
modulo the whole deontic machinery. We have in addition the compact representation of
status sets, whereas nothing comparable is provided in Brzoska [14], and the distinguished
time point tnow (to evaluate our rules by distinguishing between the past and the future).
Similar remarks apply to [38].
Abadi and Manna [1] proposed a language called TEMPLOG which was later
extensively studied by another student of Manna, viz. Baudinet [10]. They take classical
first-order logic and define a next atom to be of the form ©iA where i  0 and A is an
atom in first-order logic. As usual, ©A is true at time t if A is true at time t+1. She defines
two kinds of rules—initial program clauses (IPC) are of the form N0 ←N1 ∧ · · ·∧Nk and
permanent program clauses having the form ✷C where C is an IPC. If Ni = ©numi Ai ,
then an IPC may be expressed as the tap rule
A0 : [num0,num0] ← A1 : [num1,num1] ∧ · · · ∧ Ak : [numk,numk].
A permanent rule of the form✷C where C has the IPC form shown above can be expressed
as:
A0 : [X+ num0,X+ num0] ← A1 : [X+ num1,X+ num1] ∧ · · · ∧
Ak : [X+ numk,X+ numk].
It is easy to see that TEMPLOG and its variants cannot express (at least easily) the two
examples listed in the introduction.
In addition, all the above temporal frameworks described above provide no explicit way
of building on top of arbitrary packages—something that taps certainly do.
Active databases. Active databases [20,35,39] use rules of the form “If conditionC is true
in the current database state and actions A1, . . . ,An have been done and none of actions
B1, . . . ,Bm have been done, then do action A”. This can be expressed via an ordinary agent
program of Eiter, Subrahmanian, and Pick [30] without even using the temporal features
defined in this paper as follows:
DoA ← C ∧ DoA1 ∧ · · · ∧ DoAn ∧ ¬DoB1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬DoBm.
Theories of active databases—on which one of the authors has worked—only deal with
relational and object databases, not with arbitrary packages. Furthermore, most theories of
active databases have no temporal support whatsoever nor any deontic support.
Actions and time. They have been extensively studied by many researchers in several
areas of computing (e.g., [2,21,40,46,49,50,54,56,57,65]). We present here the main
differences between others’ work and ours, and discuss work that combines time with
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deontic operators. Surveys of research on temporal reasoning include [4,8,11,12,16,47,
74].
• One of the main differences between our approach and the temporal logic approach
is that we allow the history to be partially specified but in their approach, the entire
history is defined for any time period. Allowing the history to be partially defined
is needed when modeling bounded agents, as by Subrahmanian, Bonatti, Dix, Eiter,
Kraus, Özcan, and Ross [68].
• In our model, time can be expressed explicitly (as in, for example, [73]). We do not
use the modal temporal logic approach where time periods cannot be expressed in the
language.
• We use a simple interval based temporal logic [2], and introduce a mechanism for
specifying intermediate effects of an action. We focus on the semantics of temporal
agent programs which specify the commitments of the agents. We do not have modal
operators associated with time but only with the obligations, permissions, etc. of an
agent. Other interval temporal logics (e.g., [3,7,41]) were developed for describing
complex plans and/or the study of appropriate semantics and their complexity for
interval based temporal logics.
• We presented a temporal interval constraint language in order to provide a compact
way to represent temporal feasible status sets. Other attempts to use constraints to
simplify temporal reasoning include Dechter, Meiri, and Pearl [22] who were one of
the first to apply general purpose constraint solving techniques (such as the Floyd–
Warshall shortest path algorithm) to reason about temporal relationships, and Koehler
and Treinen [45] who use a translation of their interval-based temporal logic (LLP)
into constraint logic (CPL) to obtain an efficient deduction system.
• In our framework, we allow temporal indeterminacy. For instance, a tax auditor may
be obliged to notify the subject of the audit within 30 days of performing the audit,
and an e-commerce billing system be forbidden from sending a client more than one
bill per week. However, the auditor may send the notification on any one of 30 days
leaving him with some choices. Likewise, our framework (via the notion of a temporal
action state condition) allows us to specify and evaluate conditions that are true at
some time point in a given set—this is similar to disjunctive reasoning.
Representation of goals. The BDI agent architecture [58,59] has raised the point that
agents might have goals and might need to reason with them. This has often been taken
to mean that all agents must be able to construct plans. We take the position that the BDI
model merely says that an agent development environment (such as the IMPACT system
described in [31,68]) should support the construction of agents that need to plan.
In IMPACT, once the agent program, integrity constraints, etc. are specified, the IMPACT
system creates a mobile piece of Java code. As mobility is a major requirement in a large
scale agent system (we’d like agents to move to a host with either the right data or with little
load on it if needed) we’d like to keep agents “lightweight”. They should not leave a large
footprint on a target host. Forcing every agent to have planning software causes agents to
cease being “lightweight”. Thus, in our system, we support goal oriented reasoning (or
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planning) by having a diverse set of planning agents as part of the IMPACT system. These
include:
(1) An agent developed by Dana Nau and his colleagues called SHOP that is a well
known hierarchical task network style planner [27,55];
(2) An agent that accesses MapQuest and can plan on-road routes between two
geographic addresses;
(3) An agent that can create off-road route plans using a US military off-road route
planner [13].
An agent requiring plan construction can ship a request to (the appropriate one of) the
above agents, specifying the planning problem it needs solved.
Another advantage of this solution is that new planning agents can be seamlessly added.
For instance, we are agentizing a planner based on difference constraint solving of the kind
used extensively in scheduling multimedia presentations [67].
Several researchers have combined logics of commitments and actions with time. Cohen
and Levesque [17,18] define the notion of persistence goals (P-GOAL). They assume that
if an agent has a P-GOAL toward a proposition, then the agent believes that this proposition
is not true now, but that it will be true at some time in the future. The agent will drop a
persistent goal only if it comes to believe that it is true or that it is impossible. In their
logic, time doesn’t explicitly appear in the proposition; thus, they cannot express a P-
GOAL toward propositions that will be true at some specific time in the future or consider
situations where a proposition is true now, but which the agent believes will become false
later and therefore has a P-GOAL to make it true again after it becomes false. They do not
have any notion of agent programs. Their logic is used for abstract specifications of agents
behavior.
Sonenberg, Tidhar, Werner, Kinny, Ljungberg, and Rao [66] use a similar approach
to that of Cohen and Levesque. However, they provide detailed specifications of various
plan-constructs that may be used in the development of collaborative agents. Shoham [63]
Agents0 has programs with commitments and a very simple mechanism to express time
points.
Fiadeiro and Maibaum [33] provide a complex temporal semantics to the deontic
concepts of permission and obligation in order to be able to reason about the temporal
properties of systems whose behavior has been specified in a deontic way. They are
interested in the normative behaviour of a system, while we focus on decision making
of agents over time.
Deontic logic. Horty in [43] proposes an analysis of what an agent ought to do. It is based
on a loose parallel between action in indeterministic time (branching time) and choice
under uncertainty, as it is studied in decision theory. Intuitively, a particular preference
ordering is adapted from a study of choice under uncertainty; it is then proposed that an
agent ought to see to it that A occurs whenever the agent has an available action which
guarantees the truth of A, and which is not dominated by another action that does not
guarantee the truth of A. The obligations of our agents are influenced by their programs
and we do not use decision theory. An agent’s obligations is determined using its status set
and we provide a language for writing agents program with time.
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Dignum and Kuiper [24] Dignum, Weigand, and Verharen [25] combine temporal logic
with deontic logic. Their semantics is based on Kripke models with implicit time while
ours is based on status sets where time can be explicitly expressed. They focus on modeling
deadlines and we focus on programming agents. They admit that automatic reasoning with
specifications written in their language is not yet possible.
J.J.Ch. Meyer’s group’s interesting work on deontic logic [42,52] for building agents is
closely related. However, his work does not build explicitly on top of heterogeneous data
structures, and no explicit support is present for modeling actions with intermediate effects
and with constructing agents that can reason with past/future commitments (though his
work does apply to reasoning logically about agents over time).
Their work on dynamic of commitments [51] is also important and relevant. They
present an expressive formalization of motivational attitudes such as wishes, goals and
commitments. They study the important issue of acts associated with selecting between
wishes and with (un)committing to action. In this work agents can reason about the change
in their commitments, but there is no explicit support for reasoning about time or build
explicitly on top of heterogeneous data structures.
An important aspect of deontic logic is what an agent should do when it faces
“moral dilemmas” or conflicts. This occurs (for instance) when an agent has two or
more obligations, but cannot do them all. In [30], we showed how any of the semantics
of ordinary agent programs (e.g., feasible status set, rational status set, etc.) can be
modified to handle this problem and we introduced [30] weak (feasible status set, rational
status set, etc.) semantics that accounted for moral dilemmas. The same method can be
straightforwardly applied to weaken the feasible and rational temporal status set semantics
defined in this paper, but for space reasons, we do not do this.
8. Conclusions
There has been intensive work over the years on the topic of software agents. By now,
the idea that agents are entities that have a “state” and that autonomously (and hopefully
intelligently) react to changes in the state, has taken firm root [61,63]. Important aspects
of how to build agents and reason about them logically have been studied by many
researchers—[44] provides an excellent overview.
In [30], the authors proposed a formal methodology for building agents “on top” of
heterogeneous data structures and/or legacy software. In the formalism proposed in [30],
instant t , the state of the agent was assumed to be “acceptable” (in the terms of this
paper, “acceptable” is synonymous with “satisfying the integrity constraints”). However,
the agent’s state would be “disturbed” by an external event at time t. The receipt of a
message by the agent (e.g., from a sensing device, from a clock agent recording a “tick”,
from another agent, or a human) is one way the agent’s state can change. When such a
state change occurs, the agent uses its associated structures (primarily the agent program)
to find a feasible (or rational) status set S. It then concurrently and immediately executes
all actions in Do(S) to obtain a new state that satisfies the integrity constraints. This cycle
is repeated ad infinitum or till the agent is “killed”.
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A key limitation in the [30] framework is that agents must act immediately. In addition,
all actions are assumed to be instantaneous (i.e., actions take no time for execution).
However, in the real world, both these assumptions are restrictive. After all, human beings
routinely make commitments for the future. Such commitments are made based on their
goals, and on their resources, and their obligations. Similarly, most actions that agents
execute take time—and during this time, there may be a need to update the agent’s state to
record the fact that an action need not finish executing for it to have intermediate effects.
In this paper, we first propose a syntax for “timed actions” that allows actions to
have duration and that allows actions to have intermediate effects while executing. We
then extend the concept of agent programs proposed in [30] to handle temporal aspects
of agent decision making. Specifically, this paper allows an agent to schedule actions
now, as well as in the future. It allows agents to determine that certain actions are
forbidden/obligatory/permitted/to be done at future instances of time, based on conditions
known to be true at the time the actions are executed (including predictions currently held
to be true). We propose a formal syntax and semantics for agents of this kind, and provide
(in the case of positive temporal agent programs only), algorithms that the agent might use
to compute such semantics.
Acknowledgements
We thank an anonymous reviewer for excellent insightful comments that helped improve
the quality of the paper.
References
[1] M. Abadi, Z. Manna, Temporal logic programming, in: Proc. 1987 IEEE Symposium on Logic Program-
ming, San Francisco, CA, 1987, pp. 4–16.
[2] J. Allen, Towards a general theory of action and time, Artificial Intelligence 23 (2) (1984) 123–144.
[3] J.F. Allen, G. Ferguson, Actions and events in interval temporal logic, J. Logic Comput. 4 (5) (1994) 531–
579.
[4] R. Alur, T.A. Henzinger, Logics and models of real time: A survey, in: J.W. de Bakker, C. Huizing,
W.P. de Roever, G. Rozenberg (Eds.), Proceedings of Real-Time: Theory in Practice, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Vol. 600, Springer, Berlin, 1992, pp. 74–106.
[5] L. Åquist, Deontic logic, in: D. Gabbay, F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol. II,
Chapter II.11, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984, pp. 605–714.
[6] K. Arisha, F. Ozcan, R. Ross, V.S. Subrahmanian, T. Eiter, S. Kraus, IMPACT: A platform for collaborating
agents, IEEE Intelligent Systems 14 (1999) 64–72.
[7] A. Artale, E. Franconi, A temporal description logic for reasoning about actions and plans, J. Artificial
Intelligence Res. 9 (1998) 463–506.
[8] A.B. Baker, Y. Shoham, Nonmonotonic temporal reasoning, in: D. Gabbay, C. Hogger, J. Robinson (Eds.),
Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1995.
[9] H. Barringer, M. Fisher, D. Gabbay, G. Gough, R. Owens, METATEM: A framework for programming in
temporal logic, in: Stepwise Refinement of Distributed Systems: Models, Formalisms, Correctness, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 430, Springer, Berlin, 1989.
[10] M. Baudinet, A simple proof of the completeness of temporal logic programming, in: L.F. del Cerro,
M. Penttonen (Eds.), Intensional Logics for Programming, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 51–
84.
J. Dix et al. / Artificial Intelligence 127 (2001) 87–135 133
[11] J. van Benthem, The Logic of Time, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1991.
[12] J. van Benthem, Temporal logic, in: D. Gabbay, C. Hogger, J. Robinson (Eds.), Handbook of Logic in
Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 241–350.
[13] J. Benton, S. Iyengar, W. Deng, N. Brener, V. Subrahmanian, Tactical route plandheing, new algorithms for
decomposing the map, Internat. J. Tools in Artificial Intelligence 5 (1, 2) (1996) 199–218.
[14] C. Brzoska, Temporal logic programming with metric and past operators, in: M. Fisher, R. Owens (Eds.),
Executable Modal and Temporal Logics, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 897, Springer, Berlin,
1995, pp. 21–39.
[15] R.G.G. Cattell et al., The Object Database Standard: ODMG-93, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1997.
[16] L. Chittaro, A. Montanari, Editorial: Temporal representation and reasoning, Ann. Math. Artificial
Intelligence 22 (1998) 1–4.
[17] P. Cohen, H. Levesque, Intention is choice with commitment, Artificial Intelligence 42 (1990) 263–310.
[18] P.R. Cohen, H. Levesque, Rational interaction as the basis for communication, in: P.R. Cohen, J.L. Morgan,
M.E. Pollack (Eds.), Intentions in Communication, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990, pp. 221–256.
[19] T.H. Cormen, C.E. Leiserson, R.L. Rivest, Introduction to Algorithms, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1989.
[20] U. Dayal, E. Hanson, J. Widom, Active database systems, in: W. Kim (Ed.), Modern Database Systems,
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1995, pp. 434–456.
[21] T. Dean, D. McDermott, Temporal data base management, Artificial Intelligence 32 (1) (1987) 1–55.
[22] R. Dechter, I. Meiri, J. Pearl, Temporal constraint networks, Artificial Intelligence 49 (1991) 61–95.
[23] K. Decker, J. Li, Coordinated hospital patient scheduling, in: Proc. ICMAS’98, Paris, 1998, pp. 104–111.
[24] F. Dignum, R. Kuiper, Combining deontic logic and temporal logic for specification of deadlines, in: Proc.
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, HICSS-97, Maui, HI, 1997.
[25] F. Dignum, H. Weigand, E. Verharen, Meeting the deadline: On the formal specification of temporal deontic
constraints, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1079, Springer, Berlin, 1996, p. 243.
[26] J. Dix, S. Kraus, V. Subrahmanian, Temporal agent programs, Technical Report CS-TR-4055, Dept. of CS,
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 2000.
[27] J. Dix, H. Munoz-Avila, D. Nau, Y. Cao, IMPACTing shop: Foundations for integrating HTN planning
and multi agency, Technical Report CS-TR-4100, Dept. of CS, University of Maryland, College Park, MD,
2000. To appear at the CLIMA ’2000 Workshop within CL 2000, London, July 2000.
[28] J. Dix, M. Nanni, V.S. Subrahmanian, Probabilistic agent reasoning, Trans. Comput. Logic 1 (2) (2000)
207–245.
[29] J. Dix, V.S. Subrahmanian, G. Pick, Meta agent programs, J. Logic Programming 46 (1–2) (2000) 1–60.
[30] T. Eiter, V. Subrahmanian, G. Pick, Heterogeneous active agents, I: Semantics, Artificial Intelligence 108
(1–2) (1999) 179–255.
[31] T. Eiter, V. Subrahmanian, T.J. Rogers, Heterogeneous active agents, III: Polynomially implementable
agents, Artificial Intelligence 117 (1) (2000) 107–167.
[32] T. Eiter, V.S. Subrahmanian, Heterogeneous active agents, II: Algorithms and complexity, Artificial
Intelligence 108 (1–2) (1999) 257–307.
[33] J. Fiadeiro, T. Maibaum, Temporal reasoning over deontic specifications, J. Logic Comput. 1 (3) (1991)
357–395.
[34] M. Fisher, A survey of Concurrent METATEM—The language and its applications, in: D.M. Gabbay,
H.J. Ohlbach (Eds.), Temporal Logic—Proceedings of the First International Conference, Springer, Berlin,
1994.
[35] M. Fisher, Towards a semantics for concurrent metatem, in: M. Fisher, R. Owens (Eds.), Executable Modal
and Temporal Logics, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 897, Springer, Berlin, 1995.
[36] M. Fisher, C. Ghidini, Programming resource-bounded deliberative agents, in: Proc. IJCAI-99, Stockholm,
Sweden, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1999, pp. 200–205.
[37] M. Fisher, R. Owens (Eds.), Executable Modal and Temporal Logics, Lecture Notes in Artificial
Intelligence, Vol. 897, Springer, Berlin, 1995.
[38] T. Frühwirth, Temporal logic and annotated constraint logic programming, in: M. Fisher, R. Owens (Eds.),
Executable Modal and Temporal Logics, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 897, Springer, Berlin,
1995, pp. 58–68.
[39] G. Gottlob, G. Moerkotte, V. Subrahmanian, The park semantics for active rules, in: Proc. 1996 Internat.
Conference on Extending Database Technology, Avignon, France, Springer, Berlin, 1996.
134 J. Dix et al. / Artificial Intelligence 127 (2001) 87–135
[40] P. Haddawy, Representing plans under uncertainty: A logic of time, chance and action, Ph.D. Thesis,
Technical Report UIUCDCS-R-91-1719, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, 1991.
[41] J. Halpern, Y. Shoham, A propositional modal interval logic, J. ACM 38 (4) (1991) 935–962.
[42] K.V. Hindriks, F.S. de Boer, W. van der Hoek, J.J.Ch. Meyer, Formal semantics of an abstract agent
programming language, in: International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages,
Providence, RI, 1997, pp. 204–218.
[43] J.F. Horty, Agency and obligation, Synthese 108 (1996) 269–307.
[44] M. Huhns, M. Singh, Readings in Agents, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1997.
[45] J. Koehler, R. Treinen, Constraint deduction in an interval-based temporal logic, in: M. Fisher, R. Owens
(Eds.), Executable Modal and Temporal Logics, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 897, Springer,
Berlin, 1995, pp. 103–117.
[46] L. Lamport, The temporal logic of actions, ACM Trans. Programming Languages and Systems 16 (3) (1994)
872–923.
[47] H. Lee, J. Tannock, J.S. Williams, Logic-based reasoning about actions and plans in artificial intelligence,
The Knowledge Engineering Review 11 (2) (1993) 91–105.
[48] J.W. Lloyd, Foundations of Logic Programming, 2nd edn., Springer, Berlin, 1987.
[49] Z. Manna, A. Pnueli, Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concurrent Systems, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,
1992.
[50] D. McDermott, A temporal logic for reasoning about processes and plans, Cognitive Sci. 6 (1982) 101–155.
[51] J.-J.Ch. Meyer, W. van der Hoek, B. van Linder, A logical approach to the dynamics of commitments,
Artificial Intelligence J. 113 (1999) 1–40.
[52] J.-J.Ch. Meyer, R. Wieringa (Eds.), Deontic Logic in Computer Science, Wiley, Chichester, 1993.
[53] R.C. Moore, Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic, Artificial Intelligence 25 (1985) 75–94.
[54] L. Morgenstern, Foundations of a logic of knowledge, action, and communication, Ph.D. Thesis, New York
University, New York, 1988.
[55] D. Nau, Y. Cao, A. Lotem, H. Muñoz-Avila, Shop: Simple hierarchical ordered planner, in: Proc. IJCAI-99,
Stockholm, Sweden, 1999.
[56] M. Nirkhe, S. Kraus, D. Perlis, M. Miller, How to (plan to) meet a deadline between Now and Then, J. Logic
Comput. 7 (1) (1997) 109–156.
[57] A. Rabinovich, Expressive completeness of temporal logic of action, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Vol. 1450, Springer, Berlin, 1998, pp. 229–242.
[58] A.S. Rao, Decision procedures for propositional linear-time belief-desire-intention logics, in:
M. Wooldridge, J. Müller, M. Tambe (Eds.), Intelligent Agents II—Proceedings of the 1995 Workshop on
Agent Theories, Architectures and Languages (ATAL-95), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 890,
Springer, Berlin, 1995, pp. 1–39.
[59] A.S. Rao, M. Georgeff, Modeling rational agents within a BDI-architecture, in: J.F. Allen, R. Fikes,
E. Sandewall (Eds.), Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1991,
pp. 473–484.
[60] R. Reiter, A logic for default reasoning, Artificial Intelligence 13 (1980) 81–132.
[61] J.S. Rosenschein, G. Zlotkin, Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions for Automated Negotiation
Among Computers, MIT Press, Boston, 1994.
[62] S. Sen, T. Haynes, N. Arora, Satisfying user preferences while negotiating meetings, Internat. J. Human–
Computer Studies 47 (3) (1997) 407–427.
[63] Y. Shoham, Agent oriented programming, Artificial Intelligence 60 (1993) 51–92.
[64] J. Siegal, CORBA Fundamentals and Programming, Wiley, New York, 1996.
[65] M.P. Singh, Toward a model theory of actions: How agents do it in branching time, Computational
Intelligence 14 (3) (1998) 287–305.
[66] E. Sonenberg, G. Tidhar, E. Werner, D. Kinny, M. Ljungberg, A. Rao, Planned team activity, Technical
Report 26, Australian Artificial Intelligence Institute, Australia, 1992.
[67] V. Subrahmanian, Principles of Multimedia Database Systems, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1998.
[68] V. Subrahmanian, P. Bonatti, J. Dix, T. Eiter, S. Kraus, F. Özcan, R. Ross, Heterogenous Active Agents,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000.
[69] D.G. Sullivan, A. Glass, B.J. Grosz, S. Kraus, Intention reconciliation in the context of teamwork: An initial
empirical investigation, in: M. Klusch, O. Shehory, G. Weiss (Eds.), Cooperative Information Agents III,
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 1652, Springer, Berlin, 1999, pp. 138–151.
J. Dix et al. / Artificial Intelligence 127 (2001) 87–135 135
[70] D.G. Sullivan, S. Kraus, Intention reconciliation by collaborative agents, in: Proc. ICMAS-2000, Boston,
MA, 2000, pp. 293–300.
[71] J. Sycara, D. Zeng, Coordination of multiple intelligent software agents, Internat. J. Intelligent and
Cooperative Information Systems 5 (1996) 181–211.
[72] A. Tarski, A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications, Pacific J. Math. 5 (1955) 285–309.
[73] B. Thomas, Y. Shoham, A. Schwartz, S. Kraus, Preliminary thoughts on an agent description language,
Internat. J. Intelligent Systems 6 (5) (1991) 497–508.
[74] L. Vila, A survey on temporal reasoning in artificial intelligence, AI Comm. 7 (1) (1994) 4–28.
[75] K. Yoon, C. Hwang, Multiple Attribute Decision Making: An Introduction, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 1995.
[76] C. Zaniolo, S. Ceri, C. Faloutsos, R. Snodgrass, V. Subrahmanian, R. Zicari, Advanced Database Systems,
Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1997.
